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The current set of experiments was designed to investigate whether monitoring 
skills are implicated in the effectiveness of receiving feedback on performance. This was 
examined by determining whether receiving feedback improves the retention of correct 
responses as well as improves memory performance (Experiment 1), whether participants 
detect and use false feedback (Experiment 2), and whether young children’s memory 
performance improves from receiving feedback (Experiment 3). In addition, confidence 
ratings were taken as a measure of participants’ ability to monitor their performance. The 
results revealed participants’ confidence in their original responses influenced the 
effectiveness of feedback, and participants used the feedback to influence their memory 
and monitoring performance. These results imply participants’ confidence influences the 
effects of receiving feedback.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Feedback is commonly used to enhance classroom learning. Because of its wide 
use and promising applications in education, researchers have been interested for years in 
understanding what factors influence the effectiveness of feedback and how feedback 
improves memory performance (e.g., Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, Kulik, & Morgan, 1991; 
Kulhavy, 1977; Thorndike, 1913). Providing feedback after classroom assessment is a 
common technique used by teachers to help students learn material and improve 
performance on later tests (e.g., Bangert-Drowns et al. 1991), which is why researchers in 
the field of psychology and education are interested in investigating the possible benefits 
of receiving feedback. Although most research is conducted in laboratory settings (e.g., 
Anderson, Kulhavy, & Andre, 1971, 1972; Andre & Theiman, 1988; Kulhavy & 
Anderson, 1972), at times researchers have also conducted studies incorporated in the 
existing classroom lesson plans (e.g., Brosvic, Epstein, Dihoff, & Cook, 2006; Dihoff, 
Brosvic, & Epstein, 2003; Dihoff, Brosvic, Epstein, & Cook, 2004). 
 As defined by Kulhavy (1977), feedback is a procedure used to inform a learner 
of the correctness of a response and it is distinguished from reinforcement, which 
increases the probability of a response. Consequently, feedback’s role in performance is 
not to increase a particular response but to offer information about a particular memory 
response. Feedback can contain two components: verification and elaboration (Kulhavy, 
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1977; Stock & Kulhavy, 1989). Verification informs the learners of the correctness of 
their response, while elaboration indicates information about the response. The most 
common type of elaboration is providing the correct alternative (Anderson et al., 1972; 
Kulhavy, 1977; Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2005; Stock & Kulhavy, 1989). In 
academic feedback paradigms, researchers typically provide participants with feedback 
about the correctness of their original response and test whether the feedback improved 
their memory performance.  
Academic feedback paradigms consist of: (a) an initial test (Test 1), (b) feedback 
session, and (c) a final test (Test 2). Furthermore, the information being tested can either be 
learned in a study period, or the exam can test general knowledge information learned outside 
of the experiment. In many original studies testing feedback, the experimenters provided a 
study period using a technique termed programmed instruction. In this method, participants 
viewed one short paragraph and answered one or two test questions before reading a new 
paragraph (e.g., Anderson, Kulhavy, & Andre, 1972). However, the study periods in 
contemporary experimental techniques are designed to match more closely with classroom 
learning situations. In these studies participants may read a journal article, study a foreign 
language, or read a textbook chapter (e.g., Kang, McDermott, & Roediger, 2007; Pashler et 
al., 2005). The most common variable assessed is the proportion of Test 2 questions answered 
correctly (i.e., Test 2 proportion correct). Examining Test 2 proportion correct after 
receiving feedback demonstrates whether feedback improves overall performance. 
Participants can improve their overall performance by correcting their errors from Test 1 
or retaining their correct responses. Error correction is measured as the proportion of 
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errors on Test 1 that are corrected on Test 2, while the retention of correct responses is 
measured as the proportion of items answered correctly on both tests. Many factors, such 
as the timing and type of feedback, influence whether receiving feedback improves 
participants’ memory performance (e.g., Phye, 1979; Phye & Andre, 1989; Sturges, 1972). 
Typical Effects of Receiving Feedback on Memory Performance 
McConnell (2007) examined 52 classroom and lab experiments investigating the 
effectiveness of feedback on memory performance and reported that the most commonly 
reported measure is Test 2 proportion correct. In 88% of the experiments that reported 
Test 2 proportion correct, performance improved when feedback was provided (e.g., 
Clariana, Ross, & Morrison, 1991; Kulhavy & Anderson, 1972). Examining Test 1 
correct and incorrect responses separately determines how feedback improved 
performance. Stock and Kulhavy (1989) proposed that feedback works differently for 
originally correct and incorrect responses (see also Pashler et al., 2005). They suggested 
that feedback provided after a correct response strengthens and increases the durability of 
the response over time. In contrast, feedback after an error needs to: (a) eliminate the 
incorrect response, (b) substitute the correct response, and (c) strengthen the durability of 
the correct response over time. When examining initial errors and correct responses 
separately, McConnell (2007) found that receiving feedback led to increased error 
correction in 95% of the experiments reporting error correction (e.g., Kulhavy, Yekovich, 
& Dyer, 1976, 1979; McConnell & Hunt, 2007; Pashler et al., 2005). On the other hand, 
feedback had a much less consistent effect on the retention of correct responses. Only 
50% of the experiments that reported correct retention found that receiving feedback 
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increased the retention of correct responses (e.g., Dihoff et al., 2003; Dihoff et al., 2004; 
Kulhavy et al., 1976, McConnell & Hunt, 2007, Exp. 1). 
The Effect of Confidence and Feedback on Improving Memory Performance 
This clearer effect of feedback on error correction led Kulhavy and colleagues 
(e.g., Kulhavy, 1977; Kulhavy et al. 1976, 1979; Kulhavy, Stock, Hancock, Swidell, & 
Hammrich, 1990; Stock & Kulhavy, 1989) to propose that the main goal of feedback is to 
correct metacognitive errors. Metacognition is typically defined as knowledge of one’s 
cognitive processes (Hackler, 1998; Matlin, 2005; Nelson & Narens, 1990). This 
typically involves monitoring ones learning and thoughts and then using the monitoring 
to control or regulate behavior (e.g., Flavell, 1979; Hacker, 1998; Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Monitoring accuracy is typically measured by 
participants predicting how likely they will remember the item on a later test (Connor, 
Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997; Dunlosky, Rawson, & Middleton, 2005; Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996; Nelson & Narens, 1990), or by participants providing their confidence 
in their response, (e.g., Bisanz, Vesonder, & Voss, 1978; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). The 
findings from research demonstrate that although participants may be overconfident in 
their monitoring (e.g., Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980) or underconfident (e.g., 
Serra & Dunlosky, 2005), they do monitor and regulate their performance successfully 
(e.g., Dunlosky & Thiede, 1998; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Son 
& Metcalfe, 2000). Participants tend to provide higher levels of confidence for questions 
answered correctly and lower levels of confidence for those answered incorrectly (e.g., 
Bisanz et al., 1978; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996).  
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Kulhavy and Stock (1989) proposed a relationship between learners’ confidence 
judgments and the effectiveness of feedback, and emphasized the importance of factoring 
in participants’ confidence when examining the effectiveness of feedback. Borrowing 
heavily from metacognition research, they propose that participants set an expectation for 
performance (typically the goal is correct responding), and assess how much effort will 
be required to meet their goals. If their perception of the task demands does not match 
their current state of knowledge, they will exert more effort to meet the goals (see also 
Nelson & Narens, 1990). When the learners assess their confidence in their responses, the 
ratings reflect whether they believe they met their learning goals. Researchers 
investigating metacognition typically examine participants’ ability to monitor their 
performance by observing their confidence judgments, and suggest that several factors 
influence participants’ confidence judgments and the belief that they met the learning 
goals: how much of the information they understand (e.g., Tiede & Leboe, 2009), how 
well they generally perform on the task (Koriat, 2008), familiarity with the topic (e.g., 
Metcalfe, 1993), and how much and how quickly information came to mind (e.g., Koriat, 
1993).  
Confidence and Error Correction 
Kulhavy and colleagues (e.g., Kulhavy, 1977; Kulhavy et al., 1976, 1979; 
Kulhavy et al., 1990; Stock & Kulhavy, 1989) also stressed that the effects of receiving 
feedback may differ as a function of participants’ confidence in their initial responses. 
Without receiving feedback there is a strong relationship between initial confidence and 
correct responding on Test 2 (e.g., Kulhavy, et al., 1976, 1979). Participants are more 
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likely to respond on with Test 2 with a highly confident response from Test 1, regardless 
if correct, than with a low confident response. A different pattern emerges, however, after 
feedback is provided. Kulhavy and Stock (1989) proposed that feedback is compared to 
the original response, and importantly, participants evaluate the accuracy of their 
confidence in that original response. If there is a discrepancy between what the 
participants believed they knew and what they actually know, behavior is modified to 
reduce the discrepancy. Interestingly, a larger discrepancy is detected when participants 
were highly confident in their errors perhaps prompting them to exert more effort to 
understand and remember the feedback. Kulhavy et al. (1976, 1979) had participants 
learn information and then take a multiple-choice test covering the studied material. They 
provided participants with feedback after each test question, and participants controlled 
the amount of time they studied the feedback. Kulhavy et al. found participants spent 
more time studying the feedback after committing errors in high confidence than in low 
confidence. Kulhavy et al. (1990) allowed participants the opportunity to restudy the text 
after receiving feedback, and they found that participants were more likely to restudy the 
text after receiving feedback on high confident errors. This increased effort resulted in 
participants correcting more errors committed in high confidence than in low confidence.  
Butterfield and Metcalfe (2001, 2006) demonstrated that the relationship between 
confidence in Test 1 responses and feedback persists even when participants do not have 
control of the amount of time they study the feedback. They proposed that participants 
provide more attention to high confident errors than to low confident errors. Butterfield 
and Metcalfe (2006) gave participants 619 general knowledge questions that all required 
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a single word answer. Participants answered the questions, gave a confidence rating, and 
received feedback immediately after the response. The feedback provided appeared in 
green if participants answered correctly and red if participants answered incorrectly. To 
examine whether participants paid more attention to surprising feedback, participants 
heard a tone randomly throughout the experiment, and were asked to hit the spacebar 
after hearing it. Participants were less likely to press the spacebar when viewing feedback 
that indicated their responses made in high confidence were incorrect compared to when 
the feedback indicated their responses made in low confidence were incorrect. This 
implies participants were paying more attention to the surprising feedback. Butterfield 
and Metcalfe used the term hypercorrection with feedback effect to describe the finding 
that participants corrected more errors committed in high confidence than in low 
confidence.  
Confidence and Correct Retention 
Kulhavy and colleagues (e.g., Kulhavy, 1977; Kulhavy et al., 1976, 1979; 
Kulhavy et al., 1990; Stock & Kulhavy, 1989) emphasized the importance of confidence 
when examining error correction, but not when examining the retention of correct 
responses. They did report that participants were least likely to study feedback after a 
highly confident correct response, and noted that participants studied the feedback for 
low confident errors and correct responses only briefly. They suggested that low 
confidence reflects insufficient knowledge of the material, but did not speculate on the 
role confidence may play. Butler, Karpicke, and Roediger (2008), however, recognized 
the potential role that confidence in original responses has in the retention of correct 
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responses. Butler et al. stressed that low confident correct responses also indicate a 
metacognitive error in monitoring, and that receiving feedback reduces the discrepancy 
by increasing confidence in these responses. They suggested that participants may have 
low confidence in a correct response for different reasons: (a) they made a lucky guess, 
(b) they have only some familiarity with the question, or (c) they were deciding between 
two options. In these situations, receiving feedback confirming the responses should 
increase the likelihood of retaining the responses. Participants answered questions on a 
multiple-choice test, provided confidence judgments, received feedback, and answered 
questions on a cued-recall test. Participants were forced to respond on the multiple-choice 
test, but were allowed to refrain from responding on the cued-recall test. They found that 
providing feedback on the multiple-choice test enhanced the retention of correct 
responses on the cued-recall test. Butler et al. proposed that participants answered some 
questions correctly on the Test 1 recognition that were weak (or only slightly familiar), 
and receiving feedback strengthened those responses. These correct responses would 
probably not have been recalled if the initial test was the cued-recall test. Because 
participants received feedback on low confident correct responses on a multiple-choice 
test, they were now more willing to report those answers on the cued-recall test. Butler et 
al. concluded that feedback enhanced the retention of correct responses by making 
participants more likely to report an answer, and that receiving feedback enhances correct 
retention when using special testing formats in which participants are given a recognition 
test first and a recall test later.  
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 By emphasizing the importance of testing format when examining the retention of 
correct responses, Butler et al. (2008) found that receiving feedback enhanced the 
retention of correct responses from an initial recognition test onto a later cued-recall test. 
Based on the suggestion that feedback increased the retention of low confident correct 
responses, an effect of feedback on correct retention should be apparent when using 
methodology that encourages enough low confident correct responses, even when not 
using the testing formats emphasized by Butler et al. Further research is required to 
determine whether feedback increases the retention of correct responses when 
participants answer enough questions correctly in low confidence, and not simply when a 
particular testing format is used (recognition and then recall). If feedback increases the 
retention of correct responses under a wider range of conditions, than educators and 
researchers may need to emphasize the importance of receiving feedback for error 
correction and enhancing correct retention. 
Confidence in the Feedback 
A lot of emphasis has been placed on the importance of participants’ confidence 
in their original responses. But if Kulhavy and colleagues are correct (e.g., Kulhavy, 
1977; Kulhavy et al., 1976, 1979; Kulhavy et al., 1990; Stock & Kulhavy, 1989), and the 
function of feedback is to correct metacognitive errors, than participants’ confidence in 
the feedback may also be important. As Kulhavy and Stock (1989) noted, when feedback 
indicates a discrepancy between the learners’ knowledge and their goal for learning, 
participants change their behavior to reduce the discrepancy (e.g., pay more attention to 
the feedback or study the feedback longer). However, if feedback provides incorrect 
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information, it may falsely indicate a discrepancy between the learners’ goals and 
knowledge. Responding to the feedback may depend on whether participants notice that 
the feedback provides incorrect information, and whether they can ignore it. If 
participants have reason to doubt the information provided in the feedback they may be 
less likely to use the information, and may exert added effort to remember their original 
responses.  
One method of manipulating confidence in the feedback is to alert the participants 
that some or all of the feedback is false. If participants were given an explicit reason to 
doubt the feedback, then they may be able to ignore it and respond with their original 
answers. Stock, Kulhavy, and Pridemore (1992) touched on the potential importance of 
participants’ confidence in the feedback by warning participants that some of the 
feedback they were to receive may provide incorrect information about the correctness of 
their responses. Stock et al. provided true and false verification feedback, and found that 
when participants received feedback that falsely confirmed their response was right, they 
studied it longer than when the feedback falsely indicated their response was wrong. In 
addition, when the true feedback correctly confirmed their response was right, they 
studied it longer than when the feedback correctly indicated that their response was 
wrong. This indicates participants behaved similarly after receiving true and false 
feedback. At first glance, it may appear contradictory that the participants spent more 
time reading the feedback that confirmed a response. However, because the feedback 
only indicated whether the response was correct or incorrect, studying the feedback that 
indicated an incorrect response was not helpful (there was no correct alternative to study). 
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Participants could only improve their performance by reviewing the feedback that 
indicated their response was correct. Because Stock et al. did not provide the participants 
with an alternative response, it remains to be seen whether participants would use false 
feedback when provided with more information.  
No other studies using an academic feedback paradigm provided warnings that 
some of the feedback may provide incorrect information, but several studies in similar 
paradigms provided false feedback and a warning. In one of the paradigms, the hindsight 
bias paradigm, the influence of receiving feedback on memory for the original response is 
examined to determine whether participants automatically integrate feedback into their 
existing knowledge. Research investigating the hindsight bias shares many similar 
features to feedback studies, and occurs when participants make a judgment, are told the 
solution, and then misremember their original judgment as closer to the solution than the 
original response. Most research demonstrating hindsight bias suggests that when 
participants receive feedback it interferes with their memory for their original responses, 
and they automatically integrate the feedback into their existing knowledge (Fischhoff, 
1975, 1977; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Pohl & Hell, 1996). In a typical hindsight bias 
study, participants make a judgment, receive feedback about their judgment, and are 
asked to remember their original judgment. Several studies found that participants’ 
estimates of their original judgment shifts closer to the feedback (Fischhoff, 1975, 1977; 
Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Hasher, Attig, & Alba, 1981; Pohl & Hell, 1996). Although 
these findings suggest participants automatically use the feedback, if participants have a 
reason to doubt the feedback, they may be less likely to integrate the feedback into their 
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current knowledge. Hasher et al. (1981) investigated this by warning participants that 
some of the feedback was false. They asked participants general knowledge questions, 
and participants answered the questions and gave their confidence. After providing the 
answers, participants received feedback about the responses, and were then warned 
explicitly that some of the feedback was false. At test participants were told to answer 
with their original responses and confidence, and participants who received the warning 
gave responses and confidence ratings more similar to their original responses than the 
feedback. This confirms that if participants are given an explicit reason to doubt 
information, they are able to ignore it and respond with their original memories (e.g., 
Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998). 
Although participants can sometimes ignore false feedback when provided with a 
warning, it is unknown whether participants can detect false feedback without being 
warned. This is important because individuals receive information frequently, but they do 
not typically have someone indicating whether the information is correct. Individuals 
have to judge for themselves the correctness of the information and decide whether to use 
it. Furthermore, determining whether participants can detect false feedback can speak to 
the ability to monitor incoming information. In a study by Hanaba and Zaragoza (2006), 
participants were forced to respond to questions about an event they witnessed. After 
answering some questions, participants received confirmatory feedback (“Yes that is 
correct”) on questions they answered incorrectly. One week after the test, participants 
completed a recognition test, and participants were more likely to answer these questions 
again incorrectly after receiving false feedback confirming their errors. Hanaba and 
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Zaragoza’s study does not completely address whether participants detect and use false 
feedback because the false feedback was always in the form of confirming an incorrect 
answer. Researchers have not yet investigated providing misinformation for responses 
participants answered correctly. This is a critical manipulation to test whether participants 
can detect the correctness of the feedback. When participants receive false feedback that 
confirms an incorrect response, the feedback matches what they already believed was the 
correct response. Yet, when participants receive feedback that refutes a correct response, 
the feedback may provide information that conflicts with their current knowledge. Only 
in the situation where the feedback conflicts with current beliefs would there be a reason 
to question the feedback. 
Another area that sheds light on participants’ ability to detect false feedback is the 
misinformation effect paradigm. In a typical misinformation effect task, participants view 
an event and then receive a narrative that contains true information but also critical 
misinformation about the original event. Participants are then tested and asked to answer 
questions about the original event. Participants’ performance is impaired by receiving the 
misinformation (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a; Loftus, 1979; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 
1978; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). For example, Loftus et al. presented participants 
with slides of an accident and later heard a narrative describing the accident. The 
narrative contained some information that conflicted with the original scene depicted in 
the slides. Participants then answered questions about the slides, but they answered 
questions incorrectly because of the misinformation presented in the narrative. Studies 
providing misinformation consistently find that participants incorporate the 
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misinformation and will incorrectly respond with the false information from the narrative 
(e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a; Loftus et al., 1978; Payne, Toglia, & Anastasi, 1989). 
These findings suggest participants may not detect the false feedback in an academic 
feedback paradigm. However, there is an important difference between a typical 
misinformation effect study and a typical feedback study. Namely, the feedback about the 
original response comes after participants have responded on Test 1 in a feedback study, 
but before participants have responded about the original event in a misinformation 
study. Participants may be less likely to be influenced by false feedback if they have 
already responded to an event. Previous findings suggest participants’ memories are 
improved by retrieving information (e.g. Bjork, 1988; Roediger & Karpicke, 2007; 
Tulving, 1967), and these memories may be less susceptible to false information.  
Feedback and Preschool Children 
Although many researchers demonstrate that college students benefit from 
receiving feedback (e.g., Anderson et al., 1972; Brosvic, et al., 2006; Kulhavy & Anderson, 
1972; Phye & Baller, 1970), there is less work with young children receiving feedback. No 
researchers have directly examined whether preschool participants benefit similarly from 
receiving feedback as do college students, and this is an important age to assess the skill 
as these children are transitioning to formal schooling. They will be expected to learn 
new information in a structured manner at a rapid pace, and educators and parents rely on 
feedback to maximize young children’s ability to learn new information. It is important to 
determine to what extent preschool children’s learning abilities may benefit from 
receiving feedback. Only a few studies have even assessed the role of feedback in 
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participants younger than the college age range: three studies tested high school and 
middle school participants (Clariana et al., 1991; Kulhavy & Anderson, 1972; Kulhavy, 
et al., 1990) and three used participants in elementary school (Markowitz & Renner, 
1966; Peeck & Tillema, 1978-1979; Peeck et al., 1985), and in most studies, feedback led 
to greater Test 2 performance. For example, Peeck et al. (1985) examined the effect of 
feedback on children’s memory performance. In their study, fifth grade children read a 
text, answered multiple-choice questions, received feedback, and then answered the 
questions again. Children who received feedback corrected more errors than children who 
did not receive feedback. 
Preschool is an interesting age group to investigate the benefits of feedback 
because young children appear to monitor less well than do adults (Bisanz et al., 1978; 
Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970; Pressley, Levin, Ghatala, & Ahmad, 1987). Because 
one of the goals of feedback is to inform the learner of a metacognitive error, if young 
children have difficulties monitoring, they may not benefit from receiving feedback as do 
older children with more monitoring experience. Flavell et al. (1970) had 5-year-old and 
8-year-old children study items as long as needed to obtain perfect recall. The 5-year-olds 
did not obtain perfect recall, despite claiming they studied the information adequately 
whereas, the older children had perfect or near perfect recall. In another experiment, 
Pressley et al. (1987) had 6- to 11-year-old children predict their performance after taking 
a multiple-choice task and found that younger children had poorer monitoring. 
Furthermore, Bisanz et al. (1978) found that 6-year-old children had more difficulty 
monitoring the accuracy of their responses when discriminating correct and incorrect 
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answers. These examples of monitoring difficulties with 5- and 6-year old children 
suggest they may not benefit as well from receiving feedback as college students.  
There also may be other reasons to suspect that young children do not benefit 
from receiving feedback. First, according to an information processing framework of 
development, children may not be capable of benefiting from strategies that help college 
students. For example, Miller, Seier, Barron, and Probert (1994) asked preschool children 
to find and remember where objects were located, and they found children who used the 
most effective strategy to remember the objects did not actually benefit from using the 
strategy. Bjorklund and Harnishfeger (1987) found that providing children with strategies 
actually hurt their performance because using the strategies took away from other 
cognitive resources needed to complete the task. It may be that receiving feedback and 
trying to remember the feedback causes children more difficulty in processing the 
question, remembering the stories, or remembering their original responses.   
Second, preschool children are prone to perseverative errors. A perseverative 
error occurs when children respond with correct responses from earlier trials that are now 
errors on the current trials. For example, Cinan, Fakultesi, and Bolumu (2006) gave 6- to 
9-year-old children the Wisconsin card sorting task (Grant & Berg, 1948), in which 
children sorted cards that varied on three dimensions (i.e., shape, color, and number). The 
children were not told which dimension they should sort by for each trial, but they were 
given feedback after each trial. After several trials the sorting dimension changed, and a 
perseverative error occurred when children persisted on sorting by an old dimension even 
after receiving feedback that they sorted incorrectly. Cinan et al. (2006) found that the 6- 
 16
and 7-year-old children made more perseverative errors than did the 8- and 9-year-old 
children, consistent with a robust literature that suggests young children are prone to 
perseverative errors (e.g., Crone, Ridderinkhof, Worm, Somsen, & van der Molen, 2004; 
Crone, Somsen, Zanolie, & van der Molen, 2006; Zelazo, Muller, Frye, & Marcovitch, 
2003). Zelazo, Frye, and Rapus’s (1996) findings demonstrated the persistence of 
perseveration errors as they found preschool children continued to make perseverative 
errors on a card sorting task, even when they expressed knowledge of the correct rule. 
Because preschool children are prone to perseverative errors, receiving feedback may not 
be enough information to help them overcome them. As mentioned previously, the goals 
of feedback provided after an error are to substitute the error, replace the error, and 
strengthen the correct response. Because children are more likely to perseverate, it may 
be more difficult for them to inhibit and replace those errors after receiving feedback. 
Memory Explanations 
Original explanations of the misinformation effect described the effect as 
occurring through automatic updating of the original memory trace. As described in 
many studies, memory for the misleading information overwrites the original memory 
and forms a new integrated trace (e.g., Loftus 1979, 1992, 2003, 2005; Loftus & Loftus, 
1980; Loftus et al., 1978; Payne et al., 1989). Other researchers suggest the original 
memory and the misinformation form separate traces; they explain the misinformation 
effect as caused from problems with accessibility or interference, (e.g., Bekerian & 
Bowers, 1983; Christiaansen, & Ochalek, 1983), source monitoring, (e.g., Abeles & 
Morton, 1989; Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a, 1989b; Rantzen & Markham, 
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1992; Templeton & Wilcox, 2000), and bias (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; McCloskey 
& Zaragoza, 1985a, 1985b; Payne et al., 1989; Templeton & Wilcox, 2000).The 
misinformation effect is often explained using a source monitoring framework.  
McConnell (2007) further speculated that receiving feedback could be viewed 
usefully from a source monitoring framework defined as a “set of processes involved in 
making attributions about the origins of memories, knowledge, and beliefs” (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993, p. 3). Memory characteristics, such as perceptual, 
semantic, temporal, and cognitive operations, are incidentally formed during the original 
encoding and may provide information about the source of the memory. For example, the 
meaning of the information, the context the information occurred in, and any physical 
features of the information are all formed when the memory is encoded. Memories are 
not directly tagged or labeled with the source, but instead the memory characteristics are 
evaluated and a source is attributed through a decision process. During remembering, the 
information is judged based on the quantity and quality of the memory detail and then 
compared to what is expected from memories from different sources. If the memory has 
few perceptual details, it is judged to be from a source that provides few perceptual 
details (e.g., a dream). Often source monitoring occurs automatically, but difficult 
situations require a more systematic analysis of the memory qualities (Johnson, 2006; 
Johnson et al., 1993).  
According to a source monitoring explanation, the feedback and the original response 
should be viewed as two distinct traces, or sources of information. At Test 2, information 
comes to mind and a participant may attribute correctly the sources of competing information. 
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Manipulations that reduce the quality of the memory characteristics and reduce the quality of 
the decision processes weaken source monitoring. For example, divided attention during 
encoding or source attribution worsens source monitoring judgments (Troyer, Winocur, Craik, 
& Moscovitch, 1999). If source monitoring is a primary influence on feedback, then 
manipulations that affect source monitoring should similarly affect the ability to discriminate 
between the original response and feedback. Johnson et al. (1993) argued that external source 
monitoring requires discerning two externally generated sources. Viewing feedback as a second 
source of information is a form of external source monitoring. The participants must 
discriminate between two external sources (Test 1 response and feedback).  
Failure to discriminate source need not necessarily worsen performance. If, at test, 
participants remember a response but cannot discriminate the source, they may still answer 
correctly—but only in certain circumstances. Participants will answer correctly, without 
discriminating source, if an original correct response or the feedback comes to mind. According 
to a source monitoring framework, participants form memory records when completing the 
original test and while receiving feedback. These records include any perceptual details of the 
item, what they were thinking, and any cognitive operations they performed when forming the 
memory record. If participants are trying to discriminate the source of the memories when 
completing Test 2, they will be judging the memories that come to mind while answering the 
questions. When a memory comes to mind they will evaluate the record of the memory and 
judge the probability it was formed when receiving feedback or completing Test 1 (Johnson et 
al., 1993). For example, if participants realized they chose the incorrect response at the time of 
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the feedback, then these thoughts are part of the memory record for the feedback, which may 
be particularly helpful in attributing source. 
Findings from a number of other feedback studies are consistent with a source 
monitoring framework. First, several studies find that participants can still recognize their 
original responses after receiving feedback (e.g., Brosvic et al., 2006; Dihoff et al., 2004; 
Peeck & Tillema, 1978-1979). From a one-trace theory perspective, the feedback should 
impair memory of the original response and would not predict participants should be able 
to remember their original responses. A source monitoring framework explains how 
participants who receive feedback are still able to remember their original responses 
because the feedback exists as another trace (or source of information). Second, 
participants who are able to recall or recognize their original responses actually perform 
better on Test 2 than participants who are unable to recall or recognize their original 
responses (e.g., Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001; Peeck et al., 1985). Peeck et al. provided 
feedback after errors on a multiple-choice test and asked participants to respond with 
their original response and the correct response on a later test. They found that 
participants were more likely to answer Test 2 questions correctly when they correctly 
identified their original errors. Butterfield and Metcalfe asked participants to answer 
general knowledge questions, and participants received feedback on their performance. 
After a brief delay they were asked to respond with the three responses that came to 
mind, and then identify the correct response. They found that participants were more 
likely to answer Test 2 questions correctly if they included their original error in the three 
responses that came to mind. At first glance it is surprising that participants would be 
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more likely to answer questions correctly on Test 2 if they still remember their original 
incorrect response, but it may be that participants who remember their original response 
during Test 2 recognized that the feedback indicated a metacogntive error and spent more 
time reflecting on the feedback.  
The third piece of evidence to support a source-monitoring framework is the 
superior performance after delayed as opposed to immediate feedback. According to a 
source monitoring framework, as two sources occur farther apart in time their similarity 
should lessen because the context may change, resulting in improved source monitoring 
(e.g., Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Johnson et al., 1993). Items occurring further apart 
in time should have different contexts and may be easier to discriminate because of 
different temporal cues (Johnson et al., 1993). Therefore, as the delay between the 
original responses and the feedback increases, the context cues should increase and 
discrimination becomes easier. This increase in source monitoring may result in an 
increase in Test 2 performance with delayed feedback. Phye and Baller’s (1970) findings 
support this idea. In their experiment, students studied information and received Test 1 
feedback after a short or long delay. They found that participants answered a greater 
percentage of Test 2 items correctly when receiving feedback after a longer delay (see 
Hunt, Smith, & McConnell, 2009; Peeck & Tillema, 1978-1979; Phye, 1979; Phye & 
Andre, 1989).  
Young children also demonstrate successful source monitoring in some contexts, 
suggesting this same framework may be appropriate for explaining how feedback 
improves their memory performance. Foley, Johnson, and Raye (1983) demonstrated that 
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6-year-old children discriminated external sources of information to the same degree as 
young adults. The participants watched two experimenters read facts of information, and 
the 6-year-olds successfully discriminated which experimenter read which fact. 
Templeton and Wilcox (2000) proposed a developmental framework for children’s ability 
to handle multiple sources of information. In their study, children viewed a videotape of a 
crime, and then listened to a narrative about the crime. The narrative contained both true 
and false information regarding the original crime. The children also participated in a 
false belief task (see Wimmer & Perner, 1983) where participants were asked what was 
in a box of crayons, and then after being shown it contained candy they were asked what 
their friend would believe was in the box. Templeton and Wilcox found that participants 
who failed the false belief task (answered that their friend would believe candy was in the 
box) were also more likely to suffer from the misinformation in the narrative. They 
concluded that children who failed the false belief task could only hold one 
representation in mind, and because the misleading narrative provided information more 
recently that was the only representation they held. These findings suggest in an 
academic feedback paradigm younger and older children may perform well for different 
reasons. Younger children may benefit from receiving feedback because they only 
remember the feedback, while older children, with successful source monitoring skills, 
may perform well because they can distinguish between their original response and the 
feedback.  
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The Effects of Feedback on Monitoring Performance 
Educators are interested in providing feedback because of known examples of it 
improving memory performance on a later test, but receiving feedback may also improve 
test scores because it may improve students’ ability monitor their performance. Koriat 
and Goldsmith (1996) found that participants monitor accurately in some situations but 
have great difficulty in other situations. In their first experiment, participants correctly 
monitored their performance as they answered general knowledge questions and provided 
confidence judgments by giving an estimate of how likely their answer was to be correct. 
In the second experiment deceptive general knowledge questions were added. In the 
deceptive questions, one of the incorrect alternatives appeared more likely to be correct 
than the actual correct response (e.g., What is the capitol of Illinois: Chicago or 
Springfield?). When deceptive questions were included in the test, participants’ 
monitoring ability and performance suffered.  
Receiving feedback may influence participants’ ability to monitor their 
performance by participants using the feedback as a cue about their performance. When 
participants determine their confidence in performance they often use cues to judge how 
they are performing (e.g., Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002; Koriat, 
1997).  Koriat (1997) proposed the cue-utilization approach and found participants use 
different cues when predicting how well they have learned material. Receiving feedback 
regarding participants’ performance should be a useful cue that improves how well they 
monitor their performance. Gonzalez-Vallejo and Bonham (2007) found that if 
participants were rewarded or punished after providing confidence judgments, their 
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monitoring became more accurate. Receiving feedback about Test 1 would be a strong 
cue about one’s performance that participants may continue to use when assessing Test 2 
performance. Receiving feedback may improve participants’ test performance not only 
because they are receiving the correct answers, but also because they are receiving 
information to help them monitor and control their performance. 
Current Experiments 
The current studies were designed to examine the potential role monitoring has in 
influencing the effectiveness of feedback. More specifically, Experiment 1 was designed 
largely to refine our understanding of the role of confidence in the retention of correct 
responses. Several reviews of the effects of feedback reported that feedback has little 
impact on increasing the retention of correct responses (e.g., Kulhavy, 1977; Kulhavy & 
Stock, 1989), and many studies reported finding no consistent relationship between 
receiving feedback and the retention of correct responses (Kulhavy et al., 1990; 
McConnell & Hunt, 2007, Exp. 2; Pashler et al., 2005; Webb, Stock, & McCarthy, 1994). 
In contrast, Butler et al. (2008) examined the retention of correct responses, testing 
format, and confidence and demonstrated a relationship between them and the 
effectiveness of feedback. They explained that feedback enhances the retention of correct 
responses in the unique situation where participants are tested first with a multiple-choice 
test and later with a recall test. They suggest that feedback increases the retention of 
correct responses in this case because providing feedback after a recognition test makes 
participants more willing to recall those items later. In contrast, it is predicted that testing 
format is not the most important factor, but using procedures that encourage enough low 
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confident correct responses may be important in demonstrating an effect of feedback on 
the retention of correct responses. If participants answer enough questions correctly on 
Test 1 in low confidence, receiving feedback should enhance the retention of correct 
responses, even when using a multiple-choice format on Test 1 and Test 2. In Experiment 
1, participants studied journal articles, answered multiple-choice questions about these 
articles, provided confidence ratings, received feedback on the last half of the questions, 
and later answered multiple-choice questions again. These materials were designed to be 
difficult enough that participants would have low confidence in even their correct 
responses. 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine whether participants detect and 
use false feedback. Participants’ confidence in their original responses, and critically in 
the feedback itself, may influence the effectiveness of the feedback. Specifically, 
confidence in the feedback may moderate the effects of receiving it. Confidence in the 
feedback was manipulated by providing false feedback for some of the questions, and 
examining whether participants detected and continued to use the false feedback. In 
Experiment 2 participants read journal articles, answered multiple-choice test questions, 
provided confidence judgments, received feedback on the last half of the questions, and 
answered the test questions again. Importantly, 50% of the feedback participants received 
contained false information. Half of the false feedback confirmed a wrong response, 
similar to Hanaba and Zaragoza (2006), but the other half of the false feedback indicated 
a correct response was wrong. If participants are able to detect the false feedback, they 
may be less likely to use it to influence their performance. This will demonstrate whether 
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participants can detect false feedback after responding on Test 1, and if that influences 
whether they continue to use it.  
Finally, Experiment 3 was designed to examine any differences between young 
children and college participants after receiving true feedback. Both 5- and 6-year-old 
and college participants heard a children’s story, answered multiple-choice test questions, 
received feedback on performance, and completed another multiple-choice test. 
Preschool children may be less likely to benefit from receiving feedback compared to 
college students because of immature monitoring processes, information processing 
differences, or inclinations toward perseverative behavior. Alternatively, children may be 
limited to accessing the representation of the more recently received feedback. If they 
only have the representation of the feedback, they may be less likely to respond with 
original errors.
CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine if receiving feedback increases the 
retention of correct responses when participants answer Test 1 with enough low confident 
correct responses.  It was also designed to test whether receiving true feedback improved 
performance in a laboratory setting that used materials similar to those found in typical 
classroom environments. Participants studied information, completed a test, received feedback 
on a subset of their responses, and completed the same test again. Previous research suggests 
participants’ Test 2 performance should improve after receiving feedback (e.g., Kulhavy & 
Anderson, 1972).  Participants also rated their confidence in their test responses, and research 
suggests participants’ confidence ratings should be fairly accurate—they should be more 
confident in correct responses than errors (e.g., Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Participants’ 
confidence in their performance is predicted to moderate the effects of feedback, with 
participants retaining low confident correct responses and correcting high confident errors (e.g., 
Butler et al., 2008; Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001).   
Method 
Participants and Design 
Ninety-six undergraduates from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
participated in the experiment to fulfill a course requirement. The participants came from 
Introduction to Psychology, 200–level psychology courses, and 300–level psychology courses. 
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Demographic information was not recorded.1 The experiment was a within subjects design 
with two independent variable (Feedback: yes, no; and Test type: Test 1, Test 2). 
Materials 
  The four Current Directions in Psychological Science articles used in Kang, 
McDermott, and Roediger (2007) were presented to participants in this experiment (see 
Appendix A).  Participants read paper versions of the articles and completed a multiple-choice 
test after each article. Test 1 consisted of 4 subtests with each subtest corresponding to one 
article. Each subtest consisted of 12 multiple-choice questions with one correct response and 3 
incorrect distractors; eight of the questions were used in Kang et al. and four more were added 
for this experiment (see Appendix B). The questions appeared on a computer with the 4 options 
in a predetermined order listed below the question. The participants read the articles in one of 
six different orders that were counterbalanced across participants. For the feedback, both 
questions answered correctly and incorrectly were displayed on the computer with the original 
question and the original options for 13 seconds, and then the correct response and the original 
response displayed below the question for 7 seconds (see Appendix C). Note that pilot testing 
suggested participants needed this amount of time to read the feedback. Test 2 consisted of the 
48 Test 1 questions blocked by article but in a new random order.  
Design and Procedure 
Session 1. The first session lasted 2 hours. In groups of five or fewer, participants first 
completed a related experiment (see Experiment 3). Participants then had 12 minutes to read 
article 1. After reading the article they worked on a sudoku distractor puzzle for 3 minutes 
before completing an untimed test (Test 1) covering that article. The test questions were 
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presented on a computer screen one-at-a time, and participants provided their confidence on a 0 
– 100 scale after each question. After completing the test questions, the procedures were 
repeated for articles 2, 3, and 4. After completing sub-test 1 for article 4, participants completed 
an unrelated task for 5 minutes. Participants then received feedback for the tests covering all the 
questions for articles 3 and 4 only. The feedback was always provided after completion of all 
the subtests. Feedback was always presented for articles 3 and 4 because previous findings 
demonstrated that the timing of the feedback influences its effectiveness (e.g., Hunt et al., 
2009; Peeck & Tillema, 1978-1979; Phye, 1979; Phye & Andre, 1989). If feedback was 
provided after Articles 1 and 2 as well as 3 and 4, some of the feedback would be delayed 
while other feedback immediate. This may inadvertently have added another, unintended, 
variable to the studies (timing of feedback). Feedback was not provided after each test 
because previous findings demonstrate that when feedback is provided immediately on 
test questions when other test questions still remain to be answered, participants change 
their responding on Test 1 (Hunt et al., 2009). A concern with this design was that the 
feedback was never provided on the earlier questions, and participants may have 
performed more poorly on the no feedback test questions because they were less familiar 
with the task. 
   Session 2. Participants returned two days later and completed Test 2 consisting of the 
same 48 questions blocked by article but with questions presented in a new random order. As 
in session 1, the participants provided their confidence. Participants had an unlimited amount of 
time to complete the test in both sessions. A skeleton outline of the procedures for session 1 and 
session 2 includes: read article 1 Test 1 article 1  read article 2  Test 1 article 2  read 
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article 3 Test 1 article 3  read article 4  Test 1 article 4  brief delay  feedback over 
Test 1 for articles 3 and 4  long delay  Test 2 over all articles.  
Results 
For all analyses, results are significant at the .05 level. 
Overall Performance  
 Test 1 and Test 2 Proportion Correct. A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Test Type: 
Test 1, Test 2) repeated measures ANOVA on proportion correct revealed a main effect 
of test type, F(1,95) = 8.775, p = .004, ηp
2 = .085, a main effect of feedback, F(1,95) = 
30.090, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .242 and a significant interaction between receiving feedback and 
test type, F(1,95) = 79.030, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .454 (see Figure 1). Follow up contrasts 
revealed no differences on Test 1 between questions that eventually received feedback 
and those that did not, F < 1, ns, but did reveal an effect of receiving feedback on Test 2 
proportion correct, F(1,95) = 9.326, p < .0001, d = .952, such that participants answered 
more questions correctly after receiving feedback than after not receiving feedback.2  
Conditionalized Test 2 Performance 
 Performance can also be analyzed by examining Test 2 performance 
conditionalized on Test 1 performance. Participants can answer questions correctly on 
both tests (retention of correct responses), answer questions incorrectly on both tests 
(retention of errors), answer questions incorrectly but change to a correct response (error 
correction), or they can answer questions correctly on Test 1 but change to an incorrect 
response on Test 2 (new errors).   
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 Retention of responses.  A repeated measures t-test revealed a significant effect of 
receiving feedback on the retention of correct responses, t(95) = 2.617, p = .01, d = .267, 
such that participants retained more Test 1 correct responses after receiving feedback 
than after not receiving feedback. Another repeated measures t-test also revealed a 
significant effect of receiving feedback on the proportion of errors retained, t(95) = 
10.870, p < .0001, d = 1.110, specifically, participants retained fewer errors after 
receiving feedback than after not receiving feedback (see Table 1 for means and standard 
errors for responses that were retained). 
Changing responses.  A repeated measures t-test revealed a significant effect of 
receiving feedback on the proportion of errors corrected, t(95) = 10.870, p < .0001, d = 
1.457, with participants correcting more Test 1 errors after receiving feedback than after 
not receiving feedback. Another repeated measures t-test revealed a significant effect of 
receiving feedback on the proportion of new errors, t(95) = -2.617, p = .01, d = .280, such 
that participants changed fewer Test 1 correct responses to errors after receiving feedback 
than after not receiving feedback (see Table 1 for means and standard errors for responses 
that were changed). 
Confidence Ratings  
The relationship between receiving feedback and participants’ confidence in their 
test performance was also examined. Confidence ratings were an indicator of how well 
participants monitored their test performance. Due to a computer error, only Test 2 
confidence ratings for 36 participants were recorded (i.e., data from 60 participants were not 
recorded).  
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Test 1 and Test 2 confidence ratings. A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Test type: Test 
1, Test 2) repeated measures ANOVA on confidence ratings revealed no main effect of 
test type F < 1, ns, but did reveal a significant effect of feedback, F(1,35) = 8.914, p = 
.005, ηp
2 = .203, and a significant interaction between test type and receiving feedback, 
F(1,35) = 10.300, p = .003, ηp
2 = .227 (see Figure 2). Follow up contrasts revealed no 
preexisting differences for mean Test 1 confidence ratings, F < 1, ns, but did reveal that 
on Test 2 participants had higher confidence ratings in questions after receiving feedback 
than after not receiving feedback, F(1,35) = 15.290, p = .0004, d = .650.  
 Correct retention as a function of feedback and confidence. Previous research 
suggests that receiving feedback may have a different effect on the retention of correct 
responses and error correction for low and high confident responses. To that end, Test 1 
confidence ratings from 0 – 29 were classified as low confidence, while confidence 
ratings from 80 – 100 were classified as high confidence3. A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 
(Confidence rating: high, low) repeated measures ANOVA on correct retention revealed 
a main effect of receiving feedback, F(1,41) = 6.089, p = .018, ηp
2 = .129 a main effect of 
Test 1 confidence rating, F(1,41) = 27.070, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .398 and an interaction 
between receiving feedback and confidence rating, F(1,41) = 12.367, p = .001, ηp
2 = .232. 
Follow up contrasts revealed no effect of feedback on the retention of correct responses 
given in high confidence on Test 1, F < 1, ns, but did reveal an effect of feedback on Test 
2 when participants answered a Test 1 response correctly in low confidence, F(1,41) = 
20.050, p < 0.0001, d = .660 (see Figure 3). Specifically, participants were more likely to 
 32
retain low confident correct responses after receiving feedback than after receiving no 
feedback. 
Error correction as a function of feedback and confidence. A 2 (Feedback: yes, 
no) X 2 (Confidence rating: high, low) repeated measures ANOVA on error correction 
revealed a significant main effect of receiving feedback, F(1,31) = 6.483, p  = .016, ηp
2 = 
.173, such that participants retained fewer errors after receiving feedback than after not 
receiving feedback. There was no main effect of Test 1 confidence, F(1,31) = 2.207, p = 
.147, ηp
2 = .066, nor an interaction, F < 1, ns (see Figure 4). To test whether participants 
were more likely to correct errors made in high confidence than in low confidence after 
receiving feedback (the hypercorrection with feedback effect), an a priori repeated 
measures t-test examining feedback questions was conducted but revealed that 
participants did not correct more errors committed in high confidence (M = .348, SE = 
.043) than in low confidence after receiving feedback (M = .490, SE = .074), t(56) = -
1.685, p =.685, d = .450.  
 Relationship between confidence and proportion correct. Gamma correlations are 
nonparametric statistics frequently used to measure metacognitive processes such as the 
relationship between confidence and test performance, and are commonly used when at 
least one of the variables is categorical. It is a relative measure of monitoring accuracy 
that ranges from +1.0 to –1.0, with positive gamma correlations reflecting that the 
participants were more likely to assign a higher confidence rating to correct responses 
than incorrect responses. The relationship between participants Test 1 confidence and 
Test 1 performance, Test 2 confidence and Test 2 performance, and Test 1 confidence 
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and Test 2 performance were examined as a function of receiving feedback. Single 
sample t-tests were used to determine whether these correlations were significantly 
different from zero, and revealed that participants monitoring was indeed significant in 
all cases, all t(35)’s > 5.815 and all p’s < .0001. Recall that because of the computer error 
there were no confidence judgments for 60 participants on Test 2. 
A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Test type: Test 1, Test 2) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the gamma correlations between test performance and confidence revealed 
no main effect of test type, F(1,35) = 2.603, p = .116, ηp
2 = .069, but did reveal a main 
effect of feedback, F(1,35) = 5.229, p = .028, ηp
2 = .130 and an interaction between 
feedback and test type, F(1,35) = 9.590, p = .004, ηp
2 = .215. Follow up contrasts revealed 
the gamma correlation on Test 1 did not differ betweens questions that eventually 
received feedback (γ = .409), and questions that did not eventually receive feedback (γ = 
.387), F < 1, ns. However, participants had higher gamma correlations on Test 2 for 
questions that received feedback (γ = .526), than questions that did not receive feedback 
(γ = .387), F(1,35) = 13.903, p = .001, d = .621.  
 Finally a repeated measures t-test revealed that the relationship between Test 1 
confidence and Test 2 proportion correct was stronger for questions that did not receive 
feedback (γ = .322) than questions that did receive feedback (γ = .221), t(94) = 2.427, p = 
.017, d = .212.  
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 support the conclusion that feedback improves 
memory performance, and that the improvement was largely due to error correction. 
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Participants were also more likely to retain originally correct responses, less likely to turn 
correct responses to errors, and less likely to stick with originally incorrect responses 
after receiving feedback. Thus, consistent with previous findings, receiving feedback 
improved performance on Test 2 (e.g., Kulhavy & Anderson, 1972; McConnell & Hunt, 
2007; Pashler et al., 2005). 
Not only did feedback influence test performance, but it also influenced 
participants’ confidence in their performance. Participants were more confident after 
receiving feedback than after not receiving feedback, suggesting that participants 
recognized the potential benefit of receiving feedback. Importantly, confidence ratings 
moderated the effects of feedback, as seen when participants retained a greater proportion 
of Test 1 low confident correct responses after receiving feedback, but they did not retain 
a greater proportion of Test 1 high confident correct responses after receiving feedback. 
These findings support Butler et al.’s (2008) conclusions that feedback can enhance the 
retention of correct responses, and that this benefit is apparent even when using different 
testing procedures than in Butler et al.’s study. These findings suggest feedback may 
enhance the retention of correct responses in a broader range of contexts than Butler et al. 
first suggested. One interpretation of this finding is that many of the low confident 
correct responses can be thought of as correct guesses, and receiving confirmatory 
feedback may confirm these guesses increasing the likelihood of answering those 
questions correctly again (Butler et al., 2008; Hunt et al., 2009, Exp. 1).   
Surprisingly, participants did not correct more errors committed in high 
confidence after receiving feedback (e.g., Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001; Kulhavy et al., 
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1979).  Butterfield and Metcalfe (2001) explained the hypercorrection with feedback 
effect by assuming participants were surprised the high confident errors were incorrect, 
so they paid more attention to that feedback. Similarly, Kulhavy et al. (1979) found that 
participants spent more time studying feedback for errors made in high confidence than low 
confidence indicating that when participants allocate how much time they process the 
feedback they may allocate more time to feedback they find surprising. The 
hypercorrection with feedback effect may not have occurred in the current study because 
participants did not control how much time they spent studying the feedback—all 
participants read the feedback for 20 seconds, and they may have been unable to spend 
extra time on feedback that surprised them. This suggests the hypercorrection with 
feedback effect may occur only when using methods that allow participants enough time 
to study the feedback that they can allocate more time to some feedback than other 
feedback. Another possible reason for the failure to replicate the hypercorrection with 
feedback effect is the studies that typically report the effect have short retention interval 
(e.g., Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001, 2006), while the studies that have failed to find an 
effect had longer retention intervals (e.g., Butler et al., 2008; Pashler et al., 2005). 
 Receiving feedback also influenced the relative accuracy of the confidence 
ratings. Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) there were 
positive gamma correlations between participants’ confidence and performance; 
furthermore, participants better monitored their performance on Test 2 after receiving 
feedback than after not receiving feedback. Finally, participants’ Test 1 confidence 
ratings were related to their Test 2 proportion correct, but this relationship was stronger 
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when they did not receive feedback. This is unsurprising, because when participants 
receive outside information (i.e., the feedback) they have other information to influence 
how they respond on Test 2. These results demonstrate that participants may use 
feedback to assess their performance, as when they received feedback their relative 
accuracy improved. This finding confirms other research demonstrating participants use cues 
when judging their performance (e.g., Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002; 
Koriat, 1997).  
Participants used the feedback effectively and also appeared to recognize the 
benefit of receiving feedback by indicating higher confidence. Although participants use 
the feedback when the information should improve performance, it is unclear if 
participants could ignore the feedback when it would impair performance. If participants 
use the feedback because it improves performance, then they should ignore false 
feedback. Experiment 2 investigates whether participants continue to use feedback that 
contains false information.   
CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
Experiment 2 was designed to assess whether participants detect false feedback, and if 
they do, whether participants can ignore it. This is important because although participants’ 
performance in Experiment 1 indicates that confidence in their original responses influences 
how they use the feedback, it is unclear whether participants’ confidence in the feedback 
influences how they use it. If participants are less confident in the feedback, then they may be 
more likely to respond with their original responses, which would indicate that participants’ 
metacognitive assessment of the situation influences how they use feedback. Research 
investigating the hindsight bias might suggest that participants are unable to ignore feedback. 
The findings from several hindsight bias studies reveal participants use feedback to influence 
their memory performance, even when told to ignore the information (Fischhoff, 1977; 
Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Hell et al., 1988; Pohl, 1998; Pohl & Hell, 1996). In an impressive 
demonstration of the hindsight bias, hindsight bias researchers answered trivia questions and 
received the answers. When asked for their original responses, these expert participants 
demonstrated the hindsight bias, and it persisted even after they were shown they were 
demonstrating the bias (Pohl & Hell, 1996).  
Hasher et al. (1981), however, demonstrated participants are able to ignore information 
when explicitly warned the feedback contains false information. In the current study, only 50% 
of the feedback was correct. Importantly, unlike in previous studies, participants received no
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 warning that any of the feedback they received may be incorrect, and it is unclear whether 
participants can detect and ignore false feedback without receiving a warning.  The findings 
from several studies indicate that participants may notice the false feedback if it contradicts 
their existing knowledge, because participants have direct access to whether their answers were 
correct (Hart 1965, 1966, 1967; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1994). For example, Hart claimed 
participants have an internal monitor that can detect when the correct information is stored in 
memory and when it is not. Hart was interested in how participants know if they have access to 
correct stored information, even if they cannot currently access it. He used a recall-judgment-
recognition paradigm where participants were asked to recall answers to general knowledge 
questions. If they could not recall the answer, they assessed how likely they would be able to 
recognize the answer (i.e., feeling of knowing judgments). Hart demonstrated that participants 
feeling of knowing judgments were highly correlated with participants’ ability to later 
recognize the answer. He also suggested that participants’ feeling of knowing judgments were 
higher when they accessed the correct answer than an unrelated incorrect answer. If participants 
have direct access, then the false feedback would contradict their stored knowledge and they 
may reject the feedback. Other research suggests that participants may not notice the false 
feedback because they do not have direct access to whether their answers were correct (e.g., 
Koriat, 1993; Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim 1993). The results of Koriat’s (1993) research, 
for example, reveals that participants judge how likely their answers were correct from 
inferences such as how quickly they retrieved their answer. When participants retrieved their 
answer quickly, they judged it was correct; on the other hand, when it took longer to retrieve 
their answer they judged it was incorrect.  
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In the current study, participants either received true feedback, false feedback, or 
no feedback for each question after completing Test 1. Participants who noticed some of 
the feedback was incorrect may have ignored the false feedback. If this were true, 
performance on the true feedback questions would be better than on the false feedback 
and no feedback questions, but performance would not differ between the false feedback 
and no feedback questions (true feedback > no feedback = false feedback). On the other 
hand, participants might have noticed some of the feedback was false and thus ignored 
the false and the true feedback. If this were true, performance would look similar across 
true feedback, false feedback, and no feedback questions (true feedback = no feedback = 
false feedback). Another possibility is participants may have noticed some of the 
feedback was false but were unable to ignore the false feedback. In this scenario, the 
performance would be best in the true feedback condition, second best when no feedback 
was received, and worst when false feedback was received (true feedback > no feedback 
> false feedback). The final possibility is that participants may not have noticed the 
feedback was false. If this were true, then the performance would follow the same pattern 
as when participants noticed but were unable to ignore the false feedback (true feedback 
> no feedback > false feedback). 
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Ninety undergraduates from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
participated in this repeated measures design to fulfill a course requirement. The participants 
come from the same population as Experiment 1. The completely within design included one 
 40
independent variable with three levels (Feedback type: true, false, no feedback), and one 
independent variable with two levels (Test type: Test 1, Test 2). 
Materials and Procedure 
  The same materials (journal articles and test questions) and the same procedure order 
from Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2. There were four differences in the procedure: 
1. Fifty percent of the feedback was false. Half of the false feedback indicated the 
incorrect answer was correct, whereas the other half of the false feedback indicated the correct 
answer was incorrect. All of the questions had a predetermined incorrect answer designated for 
the false feedback after a participant answered correctly. The computer assigned the first three 
questions answered correctly and the first three questions answered incorrectly as the false 
feedback. Although false feedback was always provided on the first three questions answered 
correctly and incorrectly, the order of the Test 1 questions were random, ensuring the false 
feedback was not provided on the same questions for all participants. Also, the feedback was 
randomly displayed throughout the feedback session, such that even though the false feedback 
was assigned first, it was not displayed in the same order the Test 1 questions originally 
appeared, but was randomly displayed throughout the feedback session.  
2.   To ensure half of the false feedback incorrectly confirmed a wrong answer and half of 
the false feedback incorrectly indicated a that correct answer was wrong, participants had to 
answer a certain amount of questions incorrectly on Test 1 for articles 3 and 4. Only 
participants who answered at least three questions correctly and incorrectly on Test 1 for 
articles 3 and 4 received the appropriate proportion of both types of false feedback and were 
used in the analyses (n = 13 participants were removed).  
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3.  Due to computer programming, the top half of the feedback screen displayed the 
original question and multiple choice options, and the bottom half of the screen displayed only 
the letter of the original response and the letter of the correct response (see Appendix D). 
Because only the letter (and not the entire answer) was displayed, feedback was shown for two 
more seconds to allow participants time to glance up to the original options.  
4. Participants did not first participate in another experiment.  
Results 
Overall Performance 
 Test 1 proportion correct. Because 50% of the feedback was false and divided 
equally into the 2 types of false feedback, all participants used in these analyses answered 50% 
of Test 1 false feedback questions correctly. Therefore, to ensure no baseline differences 
between true feedback and no feedback questions, Test 1 proportion correct was analyzed 
comparing true feedback and false feedback only. A paired samples t-test revealed no 
preexisting differences between questions that eventually received true feedback (M = .5510, 
SEM = .0270) and no feedback (M = .5550, SEM = .0170), t(66) = -.169, p = .866, d = .041. 
Test 2 proportion correct. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of feedback type on Test 2 proportion correct, F(2,132) = 93.301, p < .0001, ηp
2 = 
.586.  A priori contrasts revealed when participants received true feedback (M = .649, SE 
= .024) they answered more Test 2 questions correctly than when they received no 
feedback (M = .499, SE = .019), F(1,66) = 50.183, p < .0001, d = 1.74, which in turn 
yielded more correct responses than false feedback (M  = .289, SE = .019), F(1,66) = 
62.929, p <.0001, d = 1.95 (true feedback > no feedback > false feedback).4 
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Because Test 1 and Test 2 proportion correct was analyzed separately, participants’ 
improvement between Test 1 and Test 2 was examined to determine how receiving feedback 
influenced performance across Tests 1 and 2. Test improvement was measured by 
calculating Test 2 proportion correct – Test 1 proportion correct. Single sample t-tests 
revealed participants’ performance improved when they received true feedback, t(66) = 
3.921, p < .0001, but when they received no feedback and false feedback their 
performance suffered, t(66) = -4.274, p < .0001, and t(66) = -11.709, p < 0.0001, 
respectively. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of feedback type 
on the percent improvement score (Test 2 proportion correct – Test 1 proportion correct), 
F(2,132) = 59.416, p <.0001, ηp
2 = .474. A priori contrasts revealed when participants 
received true feedback (M = 9.8%, SE = 2.5) their performance improved more than 
when they received no feedback (M = -5.5%, SE = 1.5), F(1,66) = 27.042, p < .0001, d  = 
1.28 which in turn yielded less decline than when they received false (M = -21.9%, SE = 
1.9), F(1,66) = 41.917, p < .0001, d = 1.59  (true feedback > no feedback > false 
feedback).  
Retention of responses. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of feedback type on the retention of correct responses, F(2,132) = 69.805, p < 
.0001, ηp
2 = .514 (see Table 2).  A priori contrasts revealed when participants received 
true feedback they retained a greater proportion of Test 1 correct responses than when 
they received no feedback, F(1,66) = 6.066, p = .016, d = .605, which in turn yielded 
more retention than when they received false feedback, F(1,66) = 85.439, p < .0001, d = 
2.27, (true feedback > no feedback > false feedback).  
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A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of feedback type on 
the retention of Test 1 errors, F(2,132) = 52.962, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .449 (see Table 2). A 
priori contrasts revealed when participants received true feedback they retained a smaller 
proportion of Test 1 errors than when they received no feedback, F(1,66) = 52.760, p < 
.0001, d = 1.78, which in turn yielded less retention than when they received false 
feedback, F(1,66) = 7.445, p = .008, d = .672 (true feedback < no feedback < false 
feedback).   
Changing Responses. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect 
of feedback type on error correction, F(2,132) 52.962, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .449 (see Table 2). 
A priori contrasts revealed when participants received true feedback they corrected a 
greater proportion of Test 1 errors than when they received no feedback, F(1,66) = 
52.760, p < .0001, d = 1.78, which in turn yielded more error correction than when they 
received false feedback F(1,66) = 7.445, p = .008, d = .672 (true feedback > no feedback 
> false feedback).  
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of feedback type on 
new errors, F(2,132) = 69.805, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .509. A priori contrasts revealed when 
participants received true feedback they changed a smaller proportion of Test 1 correct 
responses to Test 2 errors than when they received no feedback, F(1,66) = 6.066, p = 
.016, d = .605, which in turned yielded fewer new errors than when they received false 
feedback, F(1,66) = 83.727, p < .0001, d = 2.27, see Table 2 (true feedback < no 
feedback < false feedback). 
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Proportion of Responses that Match the Feedback  
To assess how likely participants were to use the true and false feedback, 
performance was analyzed by examining proportion of Test 2 responses that matched the 
true and false feedback. A 2 (Feedback type: true, false) X 2 (Test 1 correct: correct, 
incorrect) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no main effect of whether the Test 1 
response was answered correctly, F < 1, ns, but did reveal a significant main effect of 
feedback type, F(1,65) = 14.385, p < .0001, , ηp
2 = .181, and an interaction between 
feedback type and Test 1 correctness, F(1,65) = 73.742, p < .0001, , ηp
2 = .532 (see 
Figure 5). Follow up contrasts revealed that when participants answered questions 
correctly on Test 1 they were more likely to follow the true feedback than the false 
feedback, F(1,65) = 69.483, p < .0001, d = 1.02, but when participants answered the 
question incorrectly on Test 1 they were more likely to follow the false feedback than the 
true feedback, F(1,65) = 7.135, p = .01, d = .329. These results suggest that participants 
tended to retain their original responses, and follow the feedback that confirms their 
original response.  
Confidence Ratings 
Another indirect method to examine whether participants noticed some of the 
feedback was false was to compare Test 2 confidence in answers that received true 
feedback, false feedback, and no feedback. Specifically, if participants noticed the false 
feedback, then they may be less confident in these responses.  
 Mean confidence rating as a function of feedback type and test type. A 3 
(Feedback type: true, false, no feedback) X 2 (Test type: Test 1, Test 2) repeated 
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measures ANOVA revealed no main effect of feedback type on mean confidence rating, 
F < 1, ns, no main effect of test type, F(1,27) = 1.262, p  = .335, and no significant 
interaction, F < 1, ns (see Figure 6).   
The retention of correct responses as a function of feedback type and confidence. 
The confidence participants have in their original responses influence the effectiveness of 
the feedback (e.g., receiving feedback effectively enhanced the retention of correct 
responses for Test 1 low confident responses only). Examining whether confidence in 
responses still influences the effectiveness of feedback when some of the feedback is 
incorrect may further explain the relationship between confidence and feedback. When 
participants receive false feedback indicating a highly confident correct response was 
false, the participant may be less likely to trust the content of the feedback. A repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of feedback type on the retention of Test 
1 high confident (80 –100) correct responses, F(2,78) = 88.705, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .695. 
Follow up contrasts revealed participants were no more likely to retain high confident 
correct responses after receiving true feedback than after receiving no feedback, F < 1, 
ns. In contrast, participants were more likely to retain high confident correct responses 
after receiving true feedback than after receiving false feedback, F(1,39) = 124.634, p < 
.0001, d = 3.57, and no feedback than false feedback, F(1,39) = 138.255, p <.0001, d = 
3.57.  
A repeated measures ANOVA also revealed an effect of feedback type on the 
retention of correct responses given in low confidence (0 – 29), F(2,36) = 11.617, p < 
.0001, ηp
2 = .392. Follow up contrasts revealed participants were more likely to retain low 
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confident correct responses after receiving true feedback than after receiving no 
feedback, F(1,18) = 10.920, p = .004, d = 1.42, and after receiving true feedback than 
false feedback, F(1,18) = 18.500, p < .0001, d = 2.02. Finally, participants were not more 
likely to retain low confident correct responses on questions that did not receive feedback 
than questions that received false feedback, F(1,18) = 2.751, p = .114, d = .78 (see Figure 
7). 
Error correction as a function of feedback type and confidence. A repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of feedback type on the correction of high 
confident Test 1 errors, F(2,50) = 10.770, p = .004, ηp
2 = .301. Follow up contrasts 
revealed participants corrected more high confident errors after receiving true feedback 
than no feedback, F(1,25) = 13.832, p = .001, d = 1.48, and false feedback F(1,25) = 
12.100, p = .002, d = 1.33. There was no difference between questions that did not 
receive feedback and received false feedback, F < 1, ns. An a priori contrast revealed no 
significant differences in error correction of low confident Test 1 errors as a function of 
feedback type, F < 1, ns (see Figure 8). A repeated measures t-test also revealed no 
hypercorrection with feedback effect. Participants were as likely to correct Test 1 errors 
made in high confidence (M = .390, SE = .102) as errors made in low confidence (M = 
.270, SE = .090) after receiving true feedback, t(16) = .846, p  = .410, d = .423.  
Relationship between confidence and proportion correct. Single sample t-tests 
comparing gamma correlations for the relationship between participants Test 1 
confidence and Test 1 performance, Test 2 confidence and Test 2 performance, and Test 
1 confidence and Test 2 performance as a function of feedback type to zero revealed 
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significant monitoring, all t(26)’s > 4.514, all p’s < .067, except for the relationship 
between Test 2 confidence ratings and Test 2 performance after receiving false feedback, 
t(26) = -.002, p = .983. Low and High Confidence correct retention was analyzed in 
separate ANOVAs because only 8 participants had performance that allowed them to be 
analyzed together.  
A 3 (Feedback type: true, false, no feedback) X 2 (Test type: Test 1, Test 2) 
repeated measures ANOVA on the gamma correlations between test performance and 
confidence revealed no main effect of feedback, F(2,44) = 2.342, p = .108, ηp
2 = .096, 
and no main effect of test type, F <1, ns, but did reveal an interaction between feedback 
and test type, F(2,44) = 8.839, p = .001, ηp
2 = .287. Follow up contrasts revealed that 
participants’ gamma correlation did not differ on questions as a function of feedback type 
on Test 1, F < 1, ns, ηp
2 = .010, true feedback (γ = .403) = no feedback (γ = .385) = false 
feedback (γ = .331). Participants’ gamma correlations did differ on questions as a 
function of feedback type on Test 2, F(2,44) = 8.848, p = .001, ηp
2 = .473. Specifically, a 
priori contrasts revealed that participants had higher gamma correlations on Test 2 for 
questions that received true feedback (γ = .558) than questions that received no feedback 
(γ = .257), F(1,22) = 6.724, p = .017, d = 1.10 , and they had higher gamma correlations 
for questions that received true feedback than false feedback (γ = -.002), F(1,22) = 
19.506, p < .0001, d = 8.313.Contrasts also revealed participants did not have higher 
gamma correlations after receiving no feedback than false feedback, F(1,22) = 1.957, p = 
.176, d = .834. Low and High Confidence error correction was analyzed in separate 
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ANOVAs because only 7 participants had performance that allowed them to be analyzed 
together.  
Single sample t-tests comparing gamma correlations to zero did not reveal a 
significant relationship between Test 1 confidence and Test 2 performance after receiving 
false feedback, t(65) = 1.750, p = .085, but did after receiving true feedback and no 
receiving feedback, all t(65)’s > 3.780, all p’s < .0001.5 
A repeated measures ANOVA (Feedback type: true, false, no feedback) revealed 
an effect of feedback type on the relationship between Test 1 confidence and Test 2 
proportion correct, F(2,126) = 3.538, p = .032, ηp
2 = .110. A priori contrasts revealed a 
marginal effect of feedback type with a weaker relationship between Test 1 confidence 
ratings and Test 2 proportion correct after receiving true feedback (γ = .260) than no 
feedback (γ = .312), F(1,63) = 3.466, p = .067, d = .468, but the relationship was similar 
after receiving true feedback and false feedback (γ = .113), F < 1, ns. Finally, the 
relationship between Test 1 confidence and Test 2 proportion correct was stronger after 
receiving no feedback than false feedback, F(1,63) = 5.65, p = .008, d = .598. 
Awareness 
After completing the experiment, participants reported whether they noticed 
anything about the feedback, and 15 participants indicated they noticed the feedback did 
not match the content in the articles. Participants’ test performance and confidence 
ratings as a function of feedback type were analyzed after removing participants who 
reported being aware of the false feedback. Not surprisingly, analyses revealed the same 
patterns when these participants were removed as when they were included. Participants’ 
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test performance and confidence ratings were also analyzed treating awareness as an 
independent variable. All results were analyzed as a function of awareness, and the 
following patterns discussed in the results were significant, but a full analysis of all the 
independent variables was not possible due to the small number of aware participants. 
Therefore, the patterns and not the statistics are reported. Participants who reported being 
aware answered more questions correctly on Test 1 and maintained the enhanced 
performance on Test 2 (see Figure 9). These participants were also more likely to retain 
correct responses and less likely to change correct responses to errors. They were, 
however, just as likely to retain errors and correct errors as were participants who were 
unaware (see Table 3). Participants who reported being aware some of the feedback was 
false were more likely to follow the true feedback when they answered correctly than 
unaware participants, but they were just as likely to follow the false feedback as unaware 
participants (see Figure 10). When participants reported being aware answered 
incorrectly, they were just as likely as the unaware participants to follow the true and 
false feedback.  Finally, aware participants were more confident on Test 1 than were 
unaware participants. Only 2 participants who reported being aware of the false feedback 
had Test 2 confidence ratings, so interpreting how awareness influenced Test 2 
confidence is impossible.  
Discussion 
   An examination of performance based on the type of feedback indicated 
participants used both the true feedback and the false feedback. Specifically, participants’ 
performance improved when they received true feedback but suffered when they received 
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false feedback. Examining performance alone does not indicate whether participants 
detected if the feedback was false. Participants may have detected the false feedback but 
have been unable to ignore the feedback when answering Test 2 questions. One method 
of assessing whether participants detected the false feedback was to examine the 
participants’ confidence in their performance on the second test. Accordingly, 
participants did not detect the false feedback because (a) they were as confident in the 
false feedback responses as the other types, and (b) Test 2 confidence ratings were 
similar to Test 1. This suggests that providing false feedback does not influence 
participants’ confidence in their performance, at least as long as they are unaware the 
feedback provided false information. This is unsurprising because if participants were 
unaware the feedback is false, then there would be no reason to expect their confidence to 
lower.  
 Receiving false feedback also influenced participants’ monitoring ability. 
Participants demonstrated relative accuracy in their monitoring of their test performance, 
such that on both Test 1 and Test 2, participants were more confident in their correct 
responses. However, participants who received false feedback did not demonstrate a 
higher relative accuracy in their monitoring performance on Test 2. This demonstrates 
that receiving misinformation about one’s performance disrupts one’s ability to monitor 
test performance, and it illustrates the difficulties individuals can experience when 
monitoring their performance. This finding is consistent with Koriat and Goldsmith’s 
(1996) conclusions that participants can monitor effectively in certain situations, but 
demonstrate monitoring difficulties in others.  
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Interestingly, the results also revealed participants were more likely to use the 
feedback that indicated they should keep their original responses, regardless of the 
correctness of the feedback. Examining the participants’ test performance and confidence 
suggests participants used the false feedback and may not have noticed the feedback was 
false. These findings are in line with the findings of Hanaba and Zaragoza’s (2006) 
investigation of false feedback and eyewitness testimony. In their study, participants were 
told their wrong answers in an eyewitness testimony paradigm were actually correct and 
were thus more likely to continue to believe that their wrong answers were correct. No 
other research has provided false feedback when participants were originally correct. If 
participants somehow had inside knowledge of when their responses were correct, then 
they would have ignored the false feedback that indicated their correct responses were 
wrong (e.g., Hart, 1965). But, because participants used the false feedback and changed 
correct responses to errors, it indicates participants may not have had special insight into 
their responses, but used outside information and inferences to determine when they were 
correct (e.g., Koriat, 1993, 2008). 
 Few participants indicated they noticed that some of the feedback was false, and 
these participants started out with enhanced performance and maintained it on both tests. 
These findings may indicate that when participants were aware of the false feedback they 
were able to ignore the false feedback and stick with their original answers. Alternatively, 
participants who were aware of the false feedback may be more engaged, and thus more 
likely to use the true feedback to better their performance. The findings indicated that 
aware participants had better performance because they were engaged and more likely to 
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follow the true feedback. Still, even though they noticed some of the feedback was false, 
they were no less likely to follow the false feedback than were the unaware participants. 
All participants’ performance would have suffered less if they ignored all of the 
feedback, but only the aware participants had reason to try and ignore the feedback. In 
fact, several aware participants responded that they tried to ignore the provided feedback 
and respond with their original answers. As evidenced by their performance, aware 
participants did not ignore the feedback, which suggests participants may have difficultly 
discriminating their original responses from the provided feedback.
CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 
The goal of Experiment 3 was to examine the effects of receiving feedback in 
preschool children and college students. Experiment 3 was a first step in examining whether 
preschool children benefit from receiving feedback on their test performance. Five- and 6-year-
old children heard age appropriate stories, answered questions, and rated their confidence in 
their responses. After answering the questions, the children received feedback (all true) on half 
of their answers and then after a delay answered the same questions again.  
Sixty-two of the college participants from Experiment 1 also participated in this study.  
There are several reasons to predict preschool participants will show less of a benefit from the 
feedback. As mentioned previously, children and adults do not consistently benefit from the 
same memory strategies. Specifically, young children may use a strategy that benefits adults 
memory performance, but does not improve the children’s performance because the strategy 
uses cognitive resources needed for other components of the task (Bjorkland & Harnishfeger, 
1987; Miller et al., 1994). Not only do children fail to benefit from certain strategies, but their 
memory organization also differs from college students. Preschool children do not process the 
relationship among items as easily as older children and college students. Although young 
children can categorize information, often the thematic information needs to be very salient for 
it to help the children (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004; Denney, 1974; Kulig & Tighe, 1976; 
Schneider & Bjorklund, 1998). In previous studies, preschool children have been found to 
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classify information on perceptual similarity and not thematic similarity (Denney, 1974), they 
demonstrate less category clustering during free recall (Schneider & Bjorklund, 1998), and as 
children memorize categorized lists often they fail to detect the theme (Kulig & Tighe, 1976). 
Because children’s memories are organized less thematically than adults, it may be more 
difficult to integrate the feedback into their memories; thus the feedback may be less likely to 
come to mind and would prove less helpful. On the other hand, from a source monitoring 
perspective, children may benefit similar as adults after receiving feedback because of good 
external source monitoring skills (e.g., Drummey & Newcombe, 2002). But, if the feedback 
and the original response are very similar, children may benefit less than college participants 
after receiving feedback because of enhanced difficulties discriminating similar sources 
(Lindsay et al., 1991).  
Regardless, there is reason to predict that young children may benefit from receiving 
feedback. First, children have the ability to discriminate between two external sources (e.g., 
Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Powell & Thomson, 1997), 
indicating that children may easily discriminate the Test 1 original response from the feedback.  
Second, children demonstrate the hindsight bias (e.g., Bernstein, Atance, Metlzoff, & Loftus, 
2007; Birch & Bernstein, 2007), which suggests their memory performance is influenced by 
receiving feedback. Bernstein et al. (2007) had 3- to 5 -year-old preschool children view 
degraded objects as the images gradually became focused, and they named the object as soon 
as it became focused enough to identify it. After finishing this task the children viewed the 
same degraded objects and were asked to identify when a friend would be able to identify the 
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objects. The children demonstrated an ability to benefit from feedback by identifying the 
objects for a friend more quickly than the children originally identified the objects. These 
findings demonstrate that receiving a form of feedback can influence preschool children’s 
performance. Also, as mentioned previously, preschool children have the ability to 
discriminate between two external sources of information (Foley et al., 1983). They may 
remember both the original response and the feedback when answering Test 2, and 
successfully discriminate between responses. Also, young children may benefit from 
receiving feedback because they may only remember the feedback. As Templeton and 
Wilcox (2000) suggested, young children may only remember the more recent source of 
information because they can only hold one representation.  
Although the college participants completed the experiment using the same materials as 
the preschool children, the delay between receiving the feedback and Test 2 differed for the 
preschool and college participants. The preschool participants completed Test 2 ten minutes 
after receiving the feedback, while the college participants completed Test 2 forty-eight hours 
after receiving the feedback. This procedural difference was necessitated because of previous 
research suggesting preschool children have a faster forgetting rate than older children (e.g., 
Brainerd & Reyna, 1990,1995; Howe, 1991). For example, Howe examined forgetting 
rates at two different delay intervals (2 days and 9 days) at two different ages 
(kindergarten and 2nd grade), and in his first experiment he found that kindergarteners 
recalled fewer items at a 2-day delay than 2nd graders did at a 9-day delay. Because the 
difference in delay, any differences found between college and preschool participants 
need to be interpreted with caution.   
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Methods 
Participants and design. Sixty-two college students from Experiment 1 completed 
the experiment. Also fifty 5- and 6- year-old preschool children recruited from local daycares, 
preschools, little league sporting events, and a mailing list of local children participated in this 
experiment after receiving permission from their parents.  Results were not obtained for 6 
preschool participants because they did not complete the experiment or because of 
experimenter error.  The final preschool sample consisted of 24 females (mean age = 6.063 and 
SD = .629) and 20 males (mean age = 6.100 and SD = .590). The participants completed this 
mixed subjects design with two within subjects independent variables (Feedback: yes, no; and 
Test type: Test 1, Test 2) and one between subjects independent variable (Age: college, 
preschool). 
Preschool Children Methods 
Materials. The materials included two stories (Danny and the Dinosaur by Sid Hoff 
and Nobody Notices Minerva by Wednesday Kirwan), and a multiple-choice test consisting of 
12 questions for each story. The multiple-choice questions and options were illustrated, and the 
questions and options were presented in a fixed order for all participants. The multiple-choice 
illustrations for each question were on a piece of paper and depicted the main noun or action in 
the answer. Because not all of the children were able to read, the question and options were not 
typed out below the illustrations, see Appendix E. The questions were piloted to have children 
answering around 60% of the questions correctly.   
A confidence rating scale was also used. The scale was a 3-point Likert scale intended 
for children consisting of three smiley faces with varying degrees of a smile (smile, neutral, 
 57
frown) that represented levels of confidence (Roebers, 2002), see Appendix F.  The smile face 
indicated “sure or remember it”, the neutral face indicated “kind of sure”, and the frown face 
indicated “just guessing”. The feedback after a correct response consisted of the correct 
response marked by a star, and after an incorrect response the feedback consisted of the correct 
response marked by a star and the wrong answer marked with an X.  Test 2 consisted of the 
same questions blocked by story and in an identical order as Test 1.  
Procedure. The procedure was designed to parallel Experiment 1. Children participated 
one at a time and were first trained to use the confidence scale with the smiley faces (Roebers, 
2002). During the training session, the children learned what each smiley represented and then 
answered questions unrelated to the children stories. All children were asked the same 
questions during training, and if they had difficulty answering the questions the experimenter 
provided other examples for extended training. Following training, participants heard Story A 
(either Danny and the Dinosaur or Nobody Notices Minerva), and then played various games 
during a 5 minute delay. They then answered 12 multiple-choice questions and provided their 
confidence after each question. Five minutes after completing the test they heard Story B, and 
after another 5-minute delay they answered and gave their confidence on 12 multiple-choice 
questions covering Story B. The children played games for 5 minutes and then received 
feedback on the test for Story B only. Feedback was provided by the experimenter marking the 
responses and then pointing to the child’s answer and saying “This is your answer.” If the 
answer was correct, the experimenter said, “Let’s see the answer. Good job! You are right. You 
said x and it was x. What is the right answer?”, but if the answer was incorrect, the 
experimenter said, “Let’s see the answer. No, that is not right. You said X, but see this is the 
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right answer. What is the right answer?” Ten minutes after receiving feedback children 
completed an identical Test 2 and provided their confidence ratings.  
College Participants Methods 
 Materials. The same stories, test questions, order of the test questions, and confidence 
scale used with the preschool participants were used with the college participants. There was 
one difference in the methods, and it was that the question and written descriptions of the 
options were typed on each test page (see Appendix G). The college participants received 
feedback only on half of the test questions, and the feedback questions were determined by one 
of six different orders that were counterbalanced across participants.  
Procedure. In groups of five or fewer, participants heard only one of the two stories 
read by the experimenter, and after hearing it college students participated in Experiment 1 for 
about an hour and 15 minutes.  Participants then read and answered the 12 test questions, and 
after a 5-minute delay they received feedback on half of their questions and completed an 
identical Test 2 forty-eight hours after completing Test 1.  
Results 
 There were no effects of the sex of preschool participants for any of the analyses, 
nor did sex interact with any predictor variable. Sex will not be discussed further.  
Test 1 and Test 2 Proportion Correct 
 A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Test type: Test 1, Test 2) X 2 (Age: college, 
preschool) repeated measures ANOVA on proportion correct revealed a main effect of 
receiving feedback, F(1,104) = 51.243, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .330, a main effect of test type, 
F(1, 104) = 192.238, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .649, and a main effect of age, F(1,104) = 5.285, p 
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= .024, ηp
2 = .024. There was also a significant interaction between feedback and age, 
F(1,104) = 8.340, p = .005, ηp
2 = .074 and an interaction feedback and test type, F(1,104) 
= 80.631, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .437. There was no significant interaction between test type 
and age, F(1,104) = 1.717, p = .193, ηp
2 = .016. These interactions were qualified by a 
three-way interaction between feedback, test type, and age, F(1,104) = 4.050, p = .047, 
ηp
2 = .037 (see Figure 11). To dissect the three-way interaction, performance was divided 
by Test 1 and Test 2, and a simple effects test examining Test 1 performance revealed a 
main effect of age, such that college participants answered a greater proportion of 
questions correctly than did preschool participants, F(1,104) = 5.203, p = .025, ηp
2 = .048, 
but no main effect of feedback, F < 1, ns,  and no interaction, F(1,104) = 1.298, p = .257, 
ηp
2 = .012. A simple effects test examining Test 2 performance revealed a main effect of 
feedback, such that a greater proportion of feedback questions were answered correctly 
than no feedback questions, F(1,104) = 120.833, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .538, and an almost 
significant effect of age, F(1,104) = 3.804, p = .054, ηp
2 = .035, with college participants 
answering a greater proportion of questions correctly. This was qualified by a significant 
interaction between feedback and age, F(1,104) = 12.167, p = .001, ηp
2 = .105. Follow up 
contrasts revealed there were no differences on feedback questions as a function of age, 
F(1,104) = 1.348, p = .181, d = .263, but on questions that did not receive feedback, 
college participants answered more questions correctly than did preschool participants, 
F(1,104) = 3.239, p = .002, d = .635. 
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 Retention of Responses 
  A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Age: college, preschool) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the proportion of correct retention revealed a main effect of feedback, 
F(1,104) = 10.391, p = .002, ηp
2 = .092, an almost significant main effect of age, F(1,104) 
= 3.249, p = .074, ηp
2 = .074, and a significant interaction between feedback and age, 
F(1,104) = 4.78, p = .034, ηp
2 = .044. Follow up contrasts revealed no effect of feedback 
on the proportion of correct retention for college students, F < 1, ns; whereas, there was 
an effect of feedback for preschool participants, such that they retained more correct 
responses after receiving feedback than after not receiving feedback, F(1,104) = 8.49, p = 
.006, d = 1.665 (see Table 4 for means and standard errors of retained responses).  
A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Age: college, preschool) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the proportion of error retention revealed no main effect of age, F < 1, ns, 
but did reveal a main effect of feedback, F(1,84) = 192.268, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .696, and a 
significant interaction, F(1,84) = 8.635, p = .004, ηp
2 = .093. Follow up contrasts revealed 
college participants retained more errors after receiving feedback than did preschool 
participants, F(1,84) = 3.489, p = .065, d = .761, whereas, preschool participants retained 
more errors when they did not receive feedback, F(1,84) = 7.672, p = .007, d = 1.674  
(see Table 4 for means and standard errors of retained responses).6  
Changing Responses 
A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Age: college, preschool) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the proportion of error correction revealed no main effect of age, F < 1, ns, 
but did reveal a main effect of feedback, F(1,84) = 192.268, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .696, and a 
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significant interaction between receiving feedback and age, F(1,84) = 8.635, p = .004, ηp
2 
= .093. Follow up contrasts revealed preschool participants corrected more errors than did 
college participants after receiving feedback, F(1,84) = 3.489, p = .065, d = .761, 
whereas, preschool participants corrected fewer errors than did college participants when 
they did not receive feedback, F(1,84) = 7.672, p = .007, d = 1.674 (see Table 4 for 
means and standard errors of retained responses). 
A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Age: college, preschool) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the proportion of new errors revealed a main effect of feedback, F(1,104) = 
10.391, p = .002, ηp
2 = .092, an almost significant main effect of age, F(1,104) = 3.249, p 
= .074, ηp
2 = .074, and a significant interaction between feedback and age, F(1,104) = 
4.78, p = .034, ηp
2 = .044. Follow up contrasts revealed no effect of feedback on the 
proportion of new errors for college students, F < 1, ns, whereas, there was an effect of 
feedback for preschool participants, such that they committed fewer new errors after 
receiving feedback than after not receiving feedback, F(1,104) = 8.49, p = .006, d = 1.665 
(see Table 4 for means and standard errors of retained responses). 
Test 1 and Test 2 Mean Confidence Rating 
 A 2 (Feedback, yes, no) X 2 (Test type: Test 1, Test 2) X 2 (Age: college, 
preschool) mixed ANOVA on mean confidence rating revealed a main effect of age, 
F(1,104) = 4.005, p = .048, ηp
2 = .037, a main effect of test type, F(1,104) = 74.891, p < 
.0001, ηp
2 = .419, and an almost significant effect of feedback, F(1,104) = 2.88, p = .092 
ηp
2 = .027. The main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between feedback 
and test type, F(1,104) = 23.176, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .182, and an interaction that approached 
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significance between receiving feedback and age, F(1,104) = 2.88, p = .092, ηp
2 = .027. 
There was no interaction between test type and age, F(1,104) = 2.708, p = .103, ηp
2 = 
.025, and no three-way interaction between test type, age, and feedback, F < 1, ns. Follow 
up contrasts to interpret the interaction between feedback and test type revealed on Test 1 
participants rated no feedback questions slightly higher than they rated feedback 
questions, F(1,104) = 3.478, p = .065, d = .682; whereas, on Test 2 participants rated no 
feedback questions lower than feedback questions, F(1,104) = 20.794, d = 4.07, p < .0001 
(see Figure 12).  
Correct Retention as a Function of Feedback and Confidence. 
Because of the small sample sizes, examining correct retention and error 
correction as a function of confidence rating was analyzed separately for college 
participants and preschool participants. 
  Preschool participants. A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Confidence rating: high, 
low) repeated measures ANOVA on the retention of correct responses revealed no main 
effect of receiving feedback, F(1,6) = 1.041, p = .347, ηp
2 = .148, no main effect of 
confidence rating, F(1,6) = 2.204, p = .188, ηp
2 = .269, and no significant interaction, 
F(1,6) = 2.204, p = .188, ηp
2 = .269 (see Figure 13).  
College participants. A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Confidence rating: low, high) 
repeated measures ANOVA on correct retention revealed a significant main effect of 
receiving feedback, F(1,20) = 144.500, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .878, a significant main effect of 
confidence, F(1,20) = 107, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .843, and a significant interaction between 
receiving feedback and confidence, F(1,20) = 156.900, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .887 (see Figure 
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14). Follow up contrasts revealed no effect of feedback on the retention of correct 
responses given in high confidence (rating of 3) on Test 1, F(1,20) = 1.949, p = .178, d = 
.876. But, when participants answered a response correctly in low confidence (rating of 
1), they were more likely to also answer it correctly on Test 2 if they received feedback 
on the response than if they did not, F(1,20) = 697.174, p < .0001, d = .660. 
Error Correction as a Function of Feedback and Confidence. 
Preschool participants. A 2 (Feedback: yes, no) X 2 (Confidence rating: high, 
low) repeated measures ANOVA on error correction revealed a significant main effect of 
receiving feedback, F(1,12) = 32.241, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .729, but no main effect of 
confidence rating, F < 1, ns, nor an interaction between receiving feedback and error 
correction, F(1,12) = 1.220, p = .291, ηp
2 = .092 (see Figure 15). To test for the 
hypercorrection with feedback effect, an a priori repeated measures t-test examining 
feedback questions was conducted, but it revealed that participants did not correct more 
errors committed in high confidence (M = .907, SE = .047) than in low confidence after 
receiving feedback (M =.917, SE = .061), t(17) = .169, p = .868, d = .081.  
College participants. A repeated measures t-test revealed participants corrected 
marginally more errors after receiving feedback than not receiving feedback for 
responses given in high confidence, t(7) = 2.000, p = .087, d = .700. Participants also 
corrected more low confident errors made after receiving feedback, t(46) = 2.896, p =  
.011, d = .722 (see Figure 16). A priori t-test also revealed there was no hypercorrection 
effect, as participants did not correct more errors committed in high confidence (M = 
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.769, SE = .122) than in low confidence after receiving feedback (M = .615, SE = .128), 
t(12) = .843, p = .416, d = .486. 
Discussion 
Results provide compelling evidence that children benefit from receiving 
feedback after answering questions, and that this benefit persists at least ten minutes. 
Despite information processing limitations (e.g., Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1987) that 
could have diluted the impact of receiving feedback, children performed better on Test 2 
after receiving feedback. Their improved performance stems largely from participants 
correcting most of their Test 1 errors, and to a lesser extent, participants retaining correct 
original responses from Test 1. This improvement supports the idea that receiving 
feedback would improve memory performance in children. These findings are also 
consistent with the hindsight bias research that demonstrates children are influenced by external 
information (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2007). Finally, from the source monitoring perspective, 
children benefit from receiving feedback because they are able to maintain a memory of the 
feedback and the original memory, and successfully discriminate between the two (e.g., Foley 
et al., 1983). 
 The college participants also benefited from receiving feedback, but their 
improved performance stemmed mainly from correcting Test 1 errors and not from 
retaining Test 1 correct responses. Please note that the college participants performed 
near ceiling on Test 1, making it unlikely to observe feedback enhancing the retention of 
correct responses. These findings indicate that providing feedback can improve memory 
performance for young children as well as college students. Because of the different 
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testing procedures, though, comparisons across the age groups should be made with 
caution.  
 The college participants demonstrated the same patterns in their confidence for 
the children’s story materials as they did with the more difficult journal articles. There is 
an effect of receiving feedback on the retention of correct responses, but it is only evident 
for low confident correct responses and not high confident correct responses. If the 
confidence rating scale in Experiments 1 and 2 matched the scale in Experiment 3, 
college participants may have demonstrated greater confidence in responses in 
Experiment 3 because their performance was better. It is impossible to examine these 
differences because the scales are not equivalent. The preschool participants’ confidence 
pattern revealed the same basic patterns as the college students. They were more 
confident after receiving feedback and more confident on Test 2 than Test 1. Feedback 
did not enhance the retention of correct responses for low confident correct responses as 
it did for the college participants. Because children demonstrate poorer monitoring 
abilities, they may be less of a relationship between feedback and confidence.  
 Despite the substantial timing differences in the procedures for the children and 
college students, comparing performance as a function of age can illustrate whether they 
demonstrated similar patterns of performance. Preschool and college participants 
demonstrated very similar patterns of performance. Most importantly, they both 
improved from Test 1 to Test 2 after receiving feedback because they corrected the 
majority of their errors made on Test 1. College participants started out with superior 
performance, but the preschool participants benefited slightly more from receiving 
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feedback (i.e., corrected more errors and retained more correct responses) than the 
college participants. This is impressive because the college students were performing the 
task on materials designed to be much easier for them, are more familiar with a structured 
learning situations, and have slower rates of forgetting (Howe, 1991). This similar pattern 
of performance may suggest feedback improves memory similarly for preschool children 
and college students, and that feedback may be used to improve memory performance in 
similar contexts. These results imply that educators for both young children and college 
students may see a benefit in student performance by including feedback as one tool in 
teaching. 
CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Although memory performance is often accurate, it is now well established that 
forgetting and memory distortions commonly occur (Anderson & Neely, 1996; Koriat, 
Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000; Roediger & McDermott, 2000). Because of these memory 
errors, it is important to discover methods of correcting memory mistakes and improving 
memory performance. In the field of cognitive psychology, the last several years has seen 
a resurgence of interest in education relevant cognitive phenomena, and much of that 
interest has focused on feedback (Butler et al., 2009; McConnell & Hunt, 2007; Pashler 
et al., 2005). Previous work has established that college students’ test performance often 
improves from receiving feedback (e.g., Anderson et al., 1972; Bangert-Drowns et al., 
1991; Kulhavy, White, Topp, Chan, & Adams, 1985; Kulik & Kulik, 1988). Several 
studies suggest that the confidence participants have in their original responses influences 
the effectiveness of the feedback (e.g., Bulter et al., 2008; Metcalfe & Butterfield, 2001). 
The purpose of the current experiments was to examine the relationship between 
monitoring performance and feedback, and to determine whether feedback improves 
memory and monitoring performance for college and preschool participants. Generally, 
the results from the experiments demonstrate that both preschool and college participants 
use feedback to influence their test performance. When feedback provided true 
information it improved their performance, and when it provided false information in 
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impaired their performance. Very few participants noticed the feedback included false 
information, but even those who did continued to use the false feedback to influence their 
Test 2 performance. 
The findings from the three experiments all suggest that participants’ confidence 
influences the effectiveness of feedback. More specifically, when college participants 
received true feedback they retained more correct responses when not very confident in 
their responses, participants were more confident after receiving feedback than after not, 
and receiving feedback improved participants’ monitoring of their performance. The 
findings from Experiment 1 extended Butler et al.’s (2008) finding that feedback 
enhances the retention of correct responses. This is an important finding because 
determining whether receiving feedback can enhance the retention of correct responses 
has proved elusive for many years (Kulhavy et al., 1990; McConnell & Hunt, 2007; 
Pashler et al., 2005). In addition to demonstrating confidence is important for the 
effectiveness of feedback, these results suggest receiving feedback enhances participants’ 
memory and monitoring performance.  
The finding from Experiment 2 suggest that participants’ confidence in the 
feedback may not prove as important as is their confidence in their original responses. 
More specifically, comparing participants’ Test 2 performance in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 demonstrates the influence of receiving true and false feedback on test 
performance. When participants received 100% true feedback their performance 
improved. This improved performance stems largely from increased error correction, but 
participants were also more likely to retain low confident correct responses. This benefit 
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supports previous findings that conclude receiving feedback improves test performance 
(e.g., Kulhavy & Anderson, 1972; McConnell & Hunt, 2007; Pashler et al., 2005). When 
participants received feedback that contained 50% false information, the benefits of 
receiving feedback dropped dramatically. When participants received false feedback they 
no longer improved on Test 2, and more precisely, they did not correct Test 1 errors and 
did not retain Test 1 correct responses. When comparing directly whether participants 
were more likely to use the true or the false feedback, results revealed participants were 
more likely to use the feedback that confirmed the original response. When participants 
answered Test 1 questions correctly they were more likely to follow the true feedback 
indicating they should retain their response; however, when they answered Test 1 
questions incorrectly they were more likely to follow the false feedback indicating they 
should retain their response. These results may reflect a confirmation bias that 
participants are more accepting of information that confirms their beliefs as opposed to 
contradicts it (e.g., Baron, 2000; McKenzie, 2006). 
Comparing participants’ confidence in their responses in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 demonstrates the influence of feedback on confidence ratings and indirectly 
indicates whether participants were aware of the false feedback. The confidence ratings 
indicate participants did not detect the false feedback, as participants provided similar 
confidence ratings for answers that received true feedback and false feedback, their Test 
2 confidence ratings did not drop compared to Test 1, and their ratings were similar to 
participants who only received true feedback. Previous research reveals that participants’ 
confidence in their Test 1 responses can moderate the effects of receiving feedback (e.g., 
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Butler et al., 2008; Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001). Accordingly, in these experiments 
after receiving true feedback participants had higher retention of Test 1 correct responses 
after receiving feedback, but it only occurred when their Test 1 correct responses were 
made in low confidence. These low confident correct responses can be viewed as 
guesses, and receiving confirmatory feedback confirms these correct guesses. Confidence 
in Test 1 errors did not moderate the effects of feedback, such that participants were no 
more likely to correct errors made in high confidence than errors made in low confidence. 
As mentioned previously, the lack of a hypercorrection with feedback effect may be due 
to the amount of time participants had with the feedback.  
 Using a more direct approach to answering whether participants detect and 
continue to use false feedback was to ask participants whether they noticed anything 
about the feedback. Fifteen participants (16% of the participants) reported being aware 
the feedback was false, and these participants had better performance than participants 
who reported being unaware. Aware participants’ improved performance did not stem 
from being less likely to use the false feedback, but from aware participants answering 
more questions correctly on Test 1 than Test 2 and being more likely to follow the true 
feedback. These results suggest participants may have had difficulty discriminating 
between Test 1 responses and the feedback when completing Test 2. Because the aware 
participants noticed some of the feedback was false, their performance would have 
benefited from ignoring all of the feedback and focusing on their original Test 1 
responses. Accordingly, several participants indicated they attempted to use this strategy 
during Test 2, but their performance suggests difficultly discriminating Test 1 responses 
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from the feedback, which supports using a source monitoring framework to understand 
how feedback works.  
Source Monitoring Framework 
According to a source monitoring explanation, the feedback and the original response 
should be viewed as two sources of information. When completing Test 2, the original 
response and the feedback may come to mind, and participants will attempt to 
discriminate the origins of those memories. To answer Test 2 questions that were 
answered incorrectly on Test 1, participants must respond with the feedback and not the 
original response. When feedback impairs memory for the original responses, source 
monitoring is unnecessary to ensure a correct response. However, as evident from 
feedback research, impairment of the original response is unnecessary for correct 
responding on Test 2, as seen in many experiments when participants who received feedback 
also remember their original responses (e.g., Brosvic, et al., 2006; Clariana, Wagner, & 
Roher-Murphy, 2000; Dihoff et al., 2004; Peeck & Tillema, 1978-1979).  Peeck and Tillema 
asked participants to not only select the correct response, but to also select their original 
response, and they found that participants who received feedback were as likely as participants 
who did not receive feedback to select the original response. They also found that participants 
who answered correctly on Test 2 were as likely to remember the original response as were 
participants who answered the question incorrectly on Test 2. It is in situations that the 
feedback does not impair memory for the original response that source monitoring 
becomes helpful for error correction because participants must discriminate between 
original responses and feedback during Test 2. Failing to discriminate source should not 
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necessarily worsen performance. For example, if, at test, participants remember a response but 
cannot discriminate the source, they may answer correctly—but only if the feedback comes to 
mind or they answered correctly originally. If both responses come to mind, however, 
participants must attribute a correct source and select a correct response. 
In Experiment 1 all of the feedback was correct, so it represents a normal 
feedback situation. In this situation participants may answer correctly on Test 2 for 
different reasons. First, if the feedback impairs memory for the original response, they 
will answer correctly on Test 2 regardless of how they responded on Test 1. On the other 
hand, because previous research demonstrates consistently that feedback works without 
impairing memory for the original response, participants may use source monitoring to 
answer correctly on Test 2. If the feedback does not impair memory for the original 
response but participants successfully discriminate memory for the original response and 
the feedback, they will answer correctly regardless of how they answered on Test 1. 
When participants fail to discriminate between Test 1 responses and the feedback, 
participants may answer correctly if they happen to pick the feedback regardless of how 
they answered on Test 1. Yet, if they do not pick the feedback, they may still answer 
correctly if they pick their original response and they happened to answer it correctly on 
Test 1. They will answer incorrectly on Test 2 if they pick their original response and 
they happened to answer incorrectly on Test 1. 
In Experiment 2, because 50% of the feedback was false, there were fewer possibilities 
to answer questions correctly. In this situation, if feedback blocked memory for the original 
response participants would answer questions correctly when they received true feedback and 
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answer questions incorrectly when they received false feedback. The results of Experiment 2 
support this idea because participants did better after receiving true feedback than false 
feedback. However, because previous work demonstrates that it is not necessary for feedback 
to impair memory of the original response to be effective, a source monitoring perspective is 
appropriate to understand what may happen when feedback does not impair the original 
memory. If participants were unaware that some of the feedback was false, then they should 
follow the same path as in Experiment 1, but their performance would suffer. Specifically, if 
they discriminate between Test 1 responses and the feedback, they will answer correctly when 
they receive true feedback. If they do not discriminate the feedback from their original 
responses, they will answer correctly when they select the true feedback or when they select 
their original correct response. If they do not discriminate the feedback they will answer 
questions incorrectly when they select the false feedback or when they select their original 
incorrect response. 
Participants who were aware some of the feedback was false should not follow the 
same path when discriminating between Test 1 responses and feedback because they would 
doubt the correctness of the feedback. If aware participants can distinguish the false feedback 
from the true feedback, when they discriminate the feedback from the original response they 
should use the feedback when it was true and use their original responses when the feedback 
was false. It would be surprising, however, if the participants would be able to distinguish 
between all the true and false feedback, and this would probably only happen if participants 
were very familiar with the material. If participants suspected that some of the feedback was 
false, but were unable to discriminate which was false, the aware participants would have better 
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Test 2 performance if they responded with their original responses and not the feedback. 
Because aware participants started out answering over 50% of Test 1 questions correctly, their 
Test 2 performance would fare better sticking to their original responses and ignoring the 
feedback.  
Although several of the aware participants indicated they tried to ignore the feedback 
when answering Test 2 questions, they still used the true and the false feedback. Because 
research suggests feedback does not typically impair memory for the original responses, these 
participants seem to have had difficulty discriminating their Test 1 responses from the 
feedback. They answered Test 2 questions correctly when they answered with the true 
feedback or their Test 1 correct responses, but they answered Test 2 questions incorrectly when 
they answered with the false feedback or their original Test 1 incorrect responses. The results 
from Experiment 2 revealed that participants answered questions incorrectly on Test 2 largely 
because they were changing Test 1 correct responses to errors on Test 2 following the false 
feedback. Unfortunately only 15 participants reported being aware some of the feedback 
provided false information, and conclusions that participants continue to use the false feedback 
to influence performance, even after detecting it was false, should be made with caution.  
Future studies need to provide false feedback that more participants detect is false. With 
more participants detecting that some of the feedback is false, it will be easier to find any 
differences between aware and unaware participants. There are two potential methods to 
encourage more participants being aware of the false feedback. First, using materials 
more familiar to college participants should increase the likelihood participants will 
notice the false feedback. Although participants had 15 minutes to read each article, they 
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still answered many questions incorrectly on Test 1 suggesting unfamiliarity with the 
topic, which may have made it difficult to notice inconsistencies with the feedback. 
When participants are familiar with the topic they may have the outside knowledge to 
help detect inconsistencies in the material, and not have to rely solely on remembering 
information they read in a short study session. Second, increasing the percentage of 
questions that receive false feedback should increase the likelihood of participants 
noticing the false feedback. In Experiment 2, 50% of the feedback contained false 
answers, but if this percentage was increased more participants may be aware that some 
of the feedback is false because the feedback would contradict information they explicitly 
remember reading. If these situations increase the number of participants who detect the 
false feedback, a better test of whether participants continue to use the feedback when 
they detect it is false would be possible.  
Strictly using a source monitoring framework does not account for all of the 
findings. In addition to viewing the original response and the feedback as two separate 
sources, participants’ confidence in at least their original response is also important. For 
example, receiving feedback only increases the retention of correct responses when the 
responses are made in low confidence. Ignoring the participant’s confidence in their Test 
1 responses and simply examining whether there is an effect of feedback makes the 
effects of receiving feedback on correct responses less clear. In Experiment 2, 
participants still used the feedback even when they detected it was false. This may 
suggest that participants’ confidence in the feedback is not as important as their 
confidence in their original responses. However, very few participants actually noticed 
 76
that the feedback was false, which makes it difficult to conclude that confidence in the 
feedback is unrelated to participants’ choosing to use the feedback. 
 A source monitoring framework supports the conclusions about feedback found in 
other studies. Previous studies suggest that delayed feedback is more effective than 
immediate feedback (e.g., Peeck & Tillema, 1978-1979; Phye, 1979; Phye & Andre, 1989). 
According to a source monitoring framework, the greater the temporal separation 
between the feedback and the original response the more distinct the memory records 
because the context may change, resulting in improved source monitoring (e.g., Drummey, & 
Newcombe, 2002; Johnson et al., 1993). As the delay between the original responses and the 
feedback increases, the context cues should increase and discrimination becomes easier. Also, a 
source monitoring framework is compatible with the findings that participants can remember 
their original responses after receiving feedback. According to a source monitoring framework, 
the original response and the feedback exist as separate traces and the participant must attribute 
a source.  
Developmental Origins of Feedback 
 Results from Experiment 3 revealed that preschool children benefit from receiving 
feedback. Impressively, the preschool participants corrected over 90% of the Test 1 errors, 
which was equivalent to the error correction rate for college participants using the same 
materials. Although the college participants completed the experiment using the same materials 
as the preschool children, the procedures differed, and the biggest procedural change between 
the college participants and the preschool participants was the delay between receiving the 
feedback and Test 2. The preschool participants completed Test 2 ten minutes after receiving 
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the feedback, while the college participants completed Test 2 forty-eight hours after receiving 
the feedback. Because preschool children’s test performance improves from receiving 
feedback, it is important to understand more about the benefits of receiving feedback and 
the potential constraints. One potential area is to understand more about how long the 
benefits of receiving feedback persist. Specifically, a future study should increase the 
delay of Test 2 to time lapses more similar to college participants, and compare the 
effects of receiving feedback at different ages. This is important for several reasons. First, 
if children and college participants complete the experiment with more similar 
procedures, it will allow for a more conclusive comparison of the effects of feedback at 
different ages. This has both theoretical and applied importance. Theoretically, if children 
do not benefit from receiving feedback as compared to college participants, it may 
indicate that cognitive processes that are less developed in children are involved in how 
feedback improves memory performance. From an applied perspective, if children benefit 
less from receiving feedback than college participants, then researchers can focus on 
discovering what types of feedback may best benefit children or what other techniques to 
use. Increasing the delay between receiving feedback and completing Test 2 is also 
important to discover any constraints to the benefit of receiving feedback. Receiving 
feedback overwhelmingly improved memory performance for preschool children, and 
that benefit persists for at least 10 minutes. If receiving feedback only improves memory 
performance for such a brief time, however, providing feedback may not be a useful tool 
for improving children’s long term memory performance.    
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Despite the differences, the fact that the preschool children benefited from 
receiving feedback at a similar level as the college participants, demonstrates clearly that 
children can benefit from receiving feedback. It is impressive that children showed 
similar benefits as the college participants despite their limitations in their cognitive 
system, and despite that the college participants completed the test on materials much 
easier for them than the preschool participants. In fact, when the college participants 
completed the age appropriate task in Experiment 1, they show less of a benefit from 
feedback than did the preschool children on their age appropriate task in Experiment 3. 
Children may have performed better than the college participants for several 
reasons. First, the college participants’ enhanced delay between receiving feedback and 
completing Test 2 may have hurt their performance because they experienced more 
difficulty forgetting the information (Ebbinghaus (1885/1964), or because they had more 
difficulty discriminating the original response and the feedback. Several findings 
demonstrate that participants have more difficulty discriminating source as the delay 
between the sources increased (Bornstein & Lecompte, 1995; Frost, Ingraham, & Wilson, 
2002). Because college participants had a longer delay, they may have had more 
difficulty discriminating responses that came to mind. Second, the college participants’ 
metacognitive expectations of the situation may have worsened their performance. 
College participants’ are overconfident when they are presented with an easy task. Moore 
and Nealy told participants they would be answering easy questions or difficult questions, 
and before reading the questions participants judged how many questions they would 
answer correctly. Participants overestimated their performance answering the easy 
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questions. When participants are overconfident they exert less effort in the task. Because 
the college participants were completing both the children’s materials and the more 
difficult journal articles, they have underestimated the effort needed to remember the 
story content. Related, findings examining children’s strategy use demonstrates that when 
children exert more effort than college students, they compensate for any initial memory 
differences (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1987).  
 A source monitoring framework can also account for how young children benefit 
from feedback. Research examining children’s ability to monitor sources suggests 
children can distinguish between two external sources (e.g., Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; 
Foley et al., 1983; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Powell & Thomson, 1997). This suggests 
that if the Test 1 response and the feedback come to mind, children may be able to discriminate 
the Test 1 response from the feedback, resulting in a benefit from receiving feedback as seen in 
Experiment 3. Previous findings demonstrate, however, that children’s source monitoring is 
impaired more from very similar sources than is adults’ source monitoring. Lindsay et al. 
(1991) found that children successfully discriminate dissimilar external sources but have 
difficulty discriminating very similar sources. In their experiment, children and adults listened 
to words projected through either the left or the right side of a headset. These words were either 
presented with the same gender on both sides of the headset, or one side of the headset was 
always associated with one gender. They found that children and adults successfully 
discriminate source when the voices were different genders (dissimilar sources), but only 
children had problems discriminating the source when the voices were the same gender (similar 
sources).  These results suggest children’s performance would suffer to a greater extent than 
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adults after manipulations that increase the similarity between Test 1 responses and the 
feedback.  
One potential method for testing the appropriateness of a source monitoring framework 
for both ages is to combine source monitoring procedures and feedback procedures into one 
task, and then examine if participants who do well with the source monitoring procedures also 
do well with the feedback procedures. For example, during Test 2 participants could be asked 
to respond with all answers that come to mind, regardless if they were correct. The participants 
would then attribute the source of the memory to each answer and then select the correct 
answer. Participants who did better with source judgments should also answer more Test 2 
questions correctly. These methods could also be separated into different tasks (i.e., a source 
monitoring task and a feedback task), and participants’ performance on the two separate tasks 
can be examined to determine if there were correlations between how well one performed in a 
source monitoring task and how well one performed in a feedback task.   
Metacognition 
 Participants demonstrated relative accuracy in their monitoring as they gave higher 
confidence ratings to questions they answered correctly than questions they answered 
incorrectly. In Experiment 1, when participants received feedback their monitoring improved, 
suggesting that receiving outside information about their performance improved their 
monitoring. This finding confirms other research demonstrating participants use cues when 
judging their performance (e.g., Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002; Koriat, 
1997). As mentioned previously, Koriat (1997) proposed the cue-utilization approach and 
found participants use different cues when predicting how well they have learned material. 
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Similarly, Gonzalez-Vallejo and Bonham (2007) found that if participants are rewarded or 
punished after providing confidence judgments, their monitoring becomes more accurate. 
Receiving feedback about Test 1 would be a strong cue about one’s performance that 
participants may continue to use when assessing Test 2 performance.  In Experiment 2, 
participants’ monitoring suffered from receiving false feedback, such that participants were not 
giving Test 2 correct responses higher confidence ratings than Test 2 incorrect responses. This 
may suggest participants used the feedback when making judgments, but misinformation 
impaired the process. These findings support Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) claim that 
participants can successfully monitor under some situations but not others. They termed this 
relative accuracy monitoring resolution. They found that participants demonstrated monitoring 
resolution when they answered normal trivia questions, but when participants answered tricky 
trivia questions their monitoring resolution suffered. The findings from the current studies 
demonstrate that receiving feedback improves participants’ ability to monitor their 
performance. 
 Participants used the feedback when it provided true and false information. This 
implies participants were influenced by the feedback, regardless of the correctness of the 
information. The vast majority of participants did not detect the feedback was false, even after 
providing highly confident ratings and answering correctly, which suggests participants may 
trust the feedback more than their own memories. The preschool participants also used the 
feedback, and may have been even more likely to use it than the college participants, as they 
corrected more errors after receiving feedback than did the college participants. Previous 
research suggests children are prone to relying on the memories or suggestions from other 
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sources (e.g., Bjorklund, Bjorklund, Douglas, & Cassel, 1998; Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987). 
Ceci et al. found that young children changed their correct memories when an authority figure 
repeatedly gave misleading information. These findings suggest if children were given false 
feedback they also would have been likely to respond with the incorrect information.  
Future Directions 
These results from the experiments demonstrate that participant use true feedback to 
influence performance positively, use false feedback to influence performance negatively, and 
that the preschool and college participants both benefit from receiving feedback. There are 3 
separate programs of research that may improve understanding of how and when feedback is 
effective. They are: (a) developing a theoretical explanation of feedback, (b) providing a better 
understanding of when feedback will improve children’s memory performance, and (c) 
developing an applied focus to feedback research. Although a source monitoring framework 
has been proposed as one possible method for understanding how feedback works, several 
future steps are necessary to understand more about feedback. From a source monitoring 
perspective, participants should be making decisions about the source of their memories by 
judging the quality of the memory and then attributing it to a source. If feedback influences 
memory through source monitoring processes, then during Test 2 participants should be 
judging the memories that come to mind and attributing it to the feedback or original test. 
Because these experiments were designed to test whether participants use false feedback and 
whether they detect false feedback, they do not test the appropriateness or limits of a using a 
source monitoring approach to understanding how receiving feedback influences Test 2 
performance. A source monitoring framework was proposed because post hoc explanations of 
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the effects of feedback (e.g., benefit of delayed feedback, memory for original responses, 
difficulty discriminating false feedback) fit within a source monitoring framework. However, 
the next step in assessing if a source monitoring framework is appropriate to understand how 
feedback works is to design a program of research that makes and tests predictions based on 
source monitoring. If a source monitoring framework is appropriate, one should expect 
manipulations that influence source monitoring to influence feedback’s effectiveness. Testing 
these assumptions will demonstrate whether a source monitoring framework is an appropriate 
account of feedback. If a source monitoring framework proves an unsuccessful explanation of 
how feedback influences memory performance, other unexplored theoretical approaches need 
to be developed and examined.  
Both the preschool children and the college participants benefited from receiving 
feedback, but further steps are needed to understand more about the benefits of receiving 
feedback for young children. In addition to creating situations that allow for better comparisons 
between children and college students, a program of research should examine other conditions 
in which children can receive feedback. For example, future research needs to examine the 
learning situation in which children receive feedback. In Experiment 3, the children received 
feedback on a fictional story, but it is unclear if this benefit would extend to more complex 
materials similar to what they learn in school. Receiving feedback may be more important for 
learning in complex situations where the children have difficulty with the material. It is in these 
situations that feedback may be less effective because their cognitive resources may be needed 
to complete the difficult task, and processing and integrating the feedback may diminish those 
resources (e.g., Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1987). 
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The findings from these experiments and others (e.g., Anderson et al., 1972; Andre & 
Theiman, 1988; Butler et al., 2008; Kulhavy & Anderson, 1972; McConnell & Hunt, 2007) 
demonstrate consistently that participant’s performance improves from receiving feedback, but 
many of the studies examining feedback used laboratory situations that differ sharply from 
typical classroom environments (e.g., Anderson et al., 2007; Kulhavy & Anderson, 1972; 
McConnell & Hunt, 2007). Although not within the scope of these experiments, a future line of 
research needs to examine the benefits of receiving feedback either in classrooms or in 
situations that more closely mimic classroom learning. Examining several critical differences 
between typical feedback experiments and typical classrooms would be a good starting point 
for a more ecologically valid line of research. These key differences include: (a) students’ 
familiarity with the material, (b) the delays between studying the material and receiving a test 
on the material, (c) delays between receiving the feedback and completing Test 2, and (d) the 
availability of the feedback and study material during the delays.  Examining whether feedback 
continues to improve performance under these conditions will provide a clearer picture of the 
limits and applications of receiving feedback. 
In conclusion, the results from these experiments provided new information about the 
relationship between monitoring and feedback. Specifically, participants’ confidence is 
important in examining the effects of feedback. In Experiment 1, participants benefited from 
receiving feedback, and their confidence in the original responses moderated the effects. When 
participants completed a difficult test that encouraged low confident correct responses, 
receiving feedback enhanced the retention of correct responses. Experiment 2 was the first 
study to provide false feedback without a warning, and to examine the effects of false feedback 
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on participants’ performance and confidence ratings. These results suggest participants are 
easily influenced from feedback, even when the feedback contains misinformation. Experiment 
3 was the first experiment examining the effects of receiving feedback for both preschool and 
college participants, and the results demonstrated that both children and adults benefit from 
receiving feedback. In general, the current experiments reveal that participants use feedback to 
influence their memory performance and their assessment of their performance. Participants 
use the feedback regardless if it contains incorrect information and regardless if they notice it 
contains incorrect information. The feedback and the original memory can be viewed as two 
separate sources of information, and this may provide a framework for understanding more 
about feedback and designing future studies. 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1In another experiment, that uses part of the same subject pool, 80% females and 30% 
minorities participated in the experiment. 
2All follow up contrasts were linear contrasts where the coefficients of the groups 
sum to zero.   
3These groupings were unequal because more responses were rated as 70 - 100 
percent confident than the lower level of confidence ratings, so including a larger range 
for the lower confidence ratings allows for more similar amounts of responses in the 
lower and higher confidence rating groupings. All the analyses were also conducted using 
100 – 70 for high and 29 – 0 for low and the same patterns emerge. 
4All a priori contrasts were planned linear contrasts where the coefficients of the 
groups sum to zero. These linear contrasts were conducted because of reasons to expect 
differences between true feedback, no feedback, and false feedback.   
5The single sample t-test included Test 1 participants that did not have Test 2 
confidence ratings.   
6One participant did not make an error on Test 1. 
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APPENDIX A.  TABLES 
Table 1. 
 Experiment 1 Mean Proportion of Retention of Responses and Changing Responses. 
  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                          Feedback                             No Feedback 
 
Proportion    Mean  SE  Mean   SE 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Retention of Correct Responses .739  .017  .690  018 
 
Retention of Errors   .494  .016  .748  .016 
 
Error Correction   .506  .018  .252  .016 
 
New Errors    .261  .018  .311  .018 
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2.  
Experiment 2 Mean Proportion of Retention of Responses and Changing Responses as a 
Function of Feedback Type. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
           Feedback 
 
            True Feedback       No Feedback     False Feedback 
 
 
Proportion         Mean    SE              Mean     SE            Mean      SE                               
________________________________________________________________________ 
Retention of Correct Responses    .770     .026   .698    .020             .397     .028        
 
Retention of Errors         .481    .034   .767    .019            .837    .023              
 
Error Correction          .518    .034   .233    .019            .163     .023        
 
New Errors           .230    .026            .302    .020            .603     .028        
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3. 
Experiment 2 Mean Proportion of Retention of Responses and Changing Responses as a 
Function of Feedback Type and Awareness. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Aware 
   
           Feedback 
 
            True Feedback         No Feedback         False Feedback 
 
 
Proportion          Mean     SE               Mean     SE               Mean     SE 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Retention of Correct Responses    .914     .075   .840     .056                .500     .080        
 
Retention of Errors         .495     .099   .728   .054                 .833    .065              
 
Error Correction          .505     .099   .272   .054                 .167    .065        
 
New Errors           .086     .075    .160   .056                 .500    .080        
 _________________________ ______________________________________________ 
 
Unaware 
   
       True Feedback         No Feedback         False Feedback 
 
 
Proportion          Mean     SE               Mean     SE               Mean     SE 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Retention of Correct Responses    .750      .028     .678       .021             .38      .029        
 
Retention of Errors         .480      .037     .773       .020             .839    .024              
 
Error Correction         .520      .037     .227       .020             .164     .024        
 
New Errors          .250      .028     .322       .021              .616    .030        
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105
Table 4. 
Experiment 3 Mean Proportion of Retention of Responses and Changing Responses  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Preschool Participants   
   
     
                     Feedback                                 No Feedback 
 
Proportion      Mean     SE         Mean    SE 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Retention of Correct Responses .970   .029        .871      .041 
 
Retention of Errors   .088   .034        .807      .035 
 
Error Correction   .933   .047       .135       .025 
 
New Errors    .037   .023       .137       .029 
________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                 
College Participants   
   
            Feedback                                 No Feedback 
 
Proportion      Mean     SE         Mean    SE 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Retention of Correct Responses .961   .013       .942      .016 
 
Retention of Errors   .187   .048       .702       .016 
 
Error Correction   .802   .048       .300       .054 
 
New Errors    .038   .014       .060       .015                                   
________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B. FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. 
Experiment 1 mean percent correct as a function of receiving feedback and test type. 
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Figure 2. 
Experiment 1 mean confidence rating as a function of receiving feedback and test type.  
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Figure 3. 
Experiment 1 mean correct retention as a function of receiving feedback and confidence 
rating. 
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Figure 4.  
Experiment 1 mean error correction as a function of receiving feedback and confidence 
rating. 
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Figure 5.  
Experiment 2 mean proportion of following the feedback as a function of feedback type. 
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Figure 6.  
Experiment 2 mean confidence rating as a function of feedback type and test type. 
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Figure 7.  
Experiment 2 mean correct retention for high confident test 1 correct responses and for 
low confident test 1 correct responses. 
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Figure 8.  
Experiment 2 mean error correction for high confident test 1 errors and for low 
confident test 1 errors. 
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Figure 9.  
Experiment 2 mean proportion correct as a function of feedback, test type, and 
awareness. 
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Figure 10. 
Experiment 2 mean proportion of responses that follow the feedback as a function of 
receiving feedback, awareness, and Test 1 response. 
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Figure 11. 
Experiment 3 mean percent correct as a function of receiving feedback and test number 
for preschool participants and college participants. 
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Figure 12. 
Experiment 3 mean confidence rating as a function of receiving feedback and test type for 
preschool participants and college participants. 
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Figure 13.  
Experiment 3 retention of correct responses for high and low confident correct responses 
as a function of receiving feedback for preschool participants. 
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Figure 14.  
Experiment 3 mean correct retention for high confident test 1 correct responses and for 
low confident test 1 correct responses for college participants. 
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Figure 15.  
Experiment 3 error correction for high and low confident errors as a function of 
receiving feedback for preschool participants. 
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Figure 16. 
Experiment 3 mean error correction for high confident test 1 errors and for low confident 
test 1 errors for college participants. 
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APPENDIX C. MATERIALS 
 
Material 1.  
List of Current Direction in Psychological Science Articles and Children’s Books. 
 
Current Direction Articles 
Anastasio, P.A., Rose, K.C., & Chapman, J. (1999). Can the media create public opinion? A  
social identity approach. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8, 152-155. 
Eagly, A.H., Kulesa, P., Chen, S. (2001). Do attitudes affect Memory? Tests of the congeniality  
hypothesis. Current Directions in Psychological Science. 10, 5-9. 
Garry, M., & Polaschek, D.L.L. (2000). Imagination and memory. Current Directions in  
Psychological Science, 9, 6-10. 
Treiman, R. (2000). The foundations of literacy. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
9, 89-92. 
 
Children Books 
Hoff, S. (1958). Danny and the Dinosaur. New York: Harper Collins. 
Kirwan, W. (2007). Nobody Notices Minerva. New York: Sterling. 
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Material 2. 
Questions for the Current Direction in Psychology Articles. 
(1) What is one of the most blatant examples of how the media can induce public opinion? 
A. biased news coverage 
B. “live” telecast of events 
C. advertisements 
D. selective censorship of news stories 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(2) What difference did Archer et al. (1983) find in the way men and women are typically 
portrayed in news photographs? 
A. Men are often pictured in job-related roles, whereas women feature more 
prominently in home-related roles. 
B. Photographs of men tend to be more close-up compared to that of women. 
C. The facial expressions of men in photographs tend to be more solemn than that of 
women. 
D. Men tend to be photographed alone, whereas photos of women tend to feature them 
in a group. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(3) Persons depicted in photographs high in “face-ism” tend to be rated as more 
_______________________ . 
A. friendly 
B. confident 
C. trustworthy 
D. Intelligent 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(4) According to Mullen et al. (1986), how was newscaster Peter Jennings different when 
discussing Ronald Reagan’s 1984 campaign compared to when he discussed the campaign of 
Regan’s political opponent? 
 A. Peter Jennings smiled more when discussing Reagan. 
 B. Peter Jennings used more hand gestures when discussing Reagan. 
 C. Peter Jennings used more hand gestures when discussing Reagan. 
 D. Peter Jennings looked directly at the camera more often when discussing  
Reagan. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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(5) According to Gilens (1996), how can the media’s portrayal of America’s poor affect public 
perception of poverty? 
A. The media’s overrepresentation of African Americans in poverty can create the 
perception of more blacks in poverty than there actually are. 
B. The media’s portrayal of poor people as lacking in motivation can lead to less public 
support for social welfare and public assistance. 
C. The media’s portrayal of people in poverty as being lazy can increase negative 
attitudes. 
D. The media’s underrepresentation of certain groups in their portrayal of poverty can 
lead to those groups being neglected in social welfare policies. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(6) What is the hostile media bias? 
 A. The subtle effects of media portrayal on people’s perceptions and opinion. 
 B. The media’s influence on hostile and aggressive behavior. 
 C. The media’s reinforcement of negative stereotypes of out-group. 
 D. People on both sides of a controversy perceiving the media as hostile to their  
group. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(7) Advertising that uses an attractive person to promote a product is relying on the 
___________ route of persuasion. 
 A. central 
 B. secondary 
 C. peripheral 
 D. fundamental 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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(8) A study conducted by the authors (which involved subjects judging guilt/innocence of a 
fraternity member on charges of vandalism) found that the subject’s tendency to side with 
one’s in-group disappeared. 
 A. the subject was exposed to the opinion of an authority figure 
 B. the subject was exposed to evenly mixed opinion 
 C. opinions of others were homogeneous and perfectly correlated with group  
membership  
D. the subject was given time to consider all evidence 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(9) Person’s depicted in photographs low in “face-ism” also tend to be rated as 
A. funnier 
B. more dominant 
C. whiter 
D. heavier 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(10) Zuckerman & Kieffer (1994), Mullen et al. (1986), and Gilens (1996) all assumed the 
perceiver is an unbiased information processor who 
A. passively accepts the views offered by the media. 
B. assumed the perceiver is biased and motivated to filter the information according to  
C. support the advertisers bias 
D. deny the hostile media bias 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
        
(11) The in-group influences the thinking of members of that group on a particular topic 
A. when they have similar beliefs on that topic 
B. even when they disagree on that topic 
C. When the out-group is very outspoken against the in groups belief  
D. When they have similar beliefs on all topics 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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(12) More people who watched what network news station voted for Reagan? 
A. Fox 
B. CBS 
C. NBC 
D. ABC 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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Eagly, Kulsea, Chen (2001) 
 
(1) What is the congeniality hypothesis? 
 A. People are motivated to avoid information that challenges their attitudes. 
 B. People’s memories are biased in favor of information that agrees with their  
attitudes. 
 C. People selectively pay attention only to attitudinally agreeable information. 
 D. People tend to more elaborately process information that is inconsistent with  
their attitudes. 
  
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(2) The author’s meta-analysis of research on memory for attitude-relevant information, what 
was the trend in results for later compared to early findings? 
A. Early experiments showed that congenial information was less memorable than 
uncongenial information, whereas later research tended to yield a larger effect of 
congeniality on memory than early studies. 
B. The results tended to be inconsistent regardless of whether the studies were early or 
more recent. 
 C.  Participants in earlier studies tended to have weaker attitudes. 
 D. Later studies examined more variables than earlier studies. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 (3) What is the likely cause of the different trend in findings for earlier vs. later studies? 
 A. Improvements in the procedures used to assess memory. 
 B. Participants in later studies tended to have less polarized attitudes. 
 C. Participants in earlier studies tended to have weaker attitudes.  
 D. Later studies examined more variables than earlier studies 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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(4) What is the design procedure for a typical experiment looking at the congeniality effect? 
A. Participants attitudes toward an issue are measured before and after presentation of 
information relevant to the issue. 
B. Participants are presented with information that disagrees with their attitudes and 
their subsequent memory for that information assessed. 
C. Participants with opposing attitudes toward an issue are presented with information 
on one or both sides of the issue, and their subsequent memory for that information 
assessed. 
D. Participants are presented with information that agrees with their attitudes, and their 
subsequent memory for that information assessed. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
 (5) What did the authors propose could account for the weakness of the congeniality effect 
shown in experiments that were methodologically more rigorous? 
 A. Attitudes have little impact on memory. 
 B. people avoid information that challenges their attitudes. 
 C. People may mount an active defense and hence thoroughly process  
counterattitudinal information. 
 D. Participants had insufficiently strong attitudes. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(6). In their recent experiment (Eagly et al., 2000), the authors found what difference between 
congenial and uncongenial information? 
 A. Congenial information was recalled better than uncongenial information. 
 B. Participants had more prior knowledge of congenial information than  
uncongenial information. 
 C. Uncongenial information was better recalled soon after the message was  
presented, whereas congenial information was better recalled after a delay. 
D. Uncongenial information elicited more thought and attention than congenial 
information. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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(7) The authors propose that to persuade people to accept a position that is highly divergent 
from their own attitudes, it might be best to 
A. use an incremental approach whereby each exposure to uncongenial  
information produces only a small amount of change. 
B. expose them to large amounts of uncongenial information at one go. 
C. employ an authority figure to promote the counterattitudinal position. 
D. encourage them to think global thoughts concerning the issue rather than 
differentiated thoughts. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(8) According to dual-process theories of social judgment, a recipient who is lacking in 
motivation and capacity will likely adopt what type of approach when f aced with uncongenial 
information? 
 A. yield and capitulate to the counterattitudinal viewpoint 
 B. adopt an active resistance and confront the uncongenial information 
 C. adopt a passive, avoidant approach and process the information less 
 D. react emotionally and dismiss the information outright  
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(9) What is the usual rationale for predicting better memory for information that is attitudinally 
congenial than for information that is not congenial? 
A. people are motivated to defend their attitudes against material that challenges them 
B. people do not understand the opposing argument as well; therefore, it is more 
difficult to remember opposing information 
C. People are more familiar with congenial information; therefore, it is easier to 
remember congenial information 
D. People remember hostile information better because it is surprising 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(10) The congenial effect is 
A. is well supported in the literature 
B. received better support in later studies 
C. received better support in early studies 
D. is the one of the strongest effects in psychology research 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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 (11) The authors’ current experiments studied the congenial effect using 3 social issues 
(abortion, gays in the military, and the death penalty). They found the congenial effect 
A. stronger with the abortion issue 
B. non-existent in all 3 social issues 
C. stronger with the gays in the military issue 
D. stronger with the death penalty issue 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
 
(12) Compared to recipients of a uncongenial message, when asked to list the thoughts that had 
come to mind as they listened to the message recipients of a congenial message 
A. generated more thoughts that were relevant to the message 
B. generated less thoughts that were relevant to the message 
C. generated equivalent thoughts that were relevant to the message 
D. generated no thoughts that were relevant to the message 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 131
 
Garry and Polaschek (2000) 
 
(1) Loftus (1993) was the first systematic study to show what? 
A. detailed false memories for a whole event could be implanted 
B. emotional events tend to be particularly salient and memorable 
C. counterfactual thoughts can affect people’s judgment of outcomes 
D. people tend to misremember childhood events 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(2) According to Sarbin (1998), what strategy do people rely on when they try to remember an 
event that they do not remember? 
A. fabrication of the details 
B. exhaustive search of their memory store 
C. imagination of the event 
D. look for retrieval cues in the environment 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(3) Subjects become more confident they have experienced a counterfactual event after they 
imagine the event. This is called 
A. false memory 
B. imagination inflation 
C. illusory vividness 
D. confirmatory bias 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(4) What is source confusion? 
A. Confusing details from an imagined event with details from an experienced event. 
B. Forgetting what the source of a memory was. 
C. When the vividness of a memory is no longer a good indicator of its veracity. 
D. Misattributing content of a memory to the wrong source. 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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 (5) Two mechanisms have been proposed to account for the boost in confidence of having 
experienced an imagined counterfactual event. One is source conclusion, the other is 
_____________ . 
A. strength of memory trace. 
B. recollection. 
C. vividness of memory. 
D. familiarity 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(6) According to Heaps and Nash (1999), which of the following factors predicts people’s 
tendency to become more confident that they have actually experienced an event after 
imagining the event? 
A. Their susceptibility to influence of an authoritative person 
B. The vividness of their mental imagery 
C. Their predisposition to hypnotic suggestion 
D. Their arousal to emotional stimuli 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(7) One might be tempted to regard the confidence boosting effect of imagining an event as 
merely the statistical phenomenon of 
A. regression towards the mean 
B. restriction of range 
C. homogeneity of regression 
D. a spurious correlation 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
 (8) Why do the findings of memory-related effects of repeatedly imagination have clinical 
implications? 
A. Because patients might be imagining their disorder/illness  
B. Because various psychotherapy techniques involve imagining situation and actions 
C. Because the therapist may find it difficult to distinguish reality from imagination 
D. Because repeated imagination of events can lead to hallucinations 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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(9) Counter-factual thinking is  
A. Thinking “What if” or “If only I had done something else” 
B. Believing in a false memory 
C. Using fictional information to make a decision 
D. List all possible arguments and their counter-arguments before making a decision 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(10) How many subjects developed a false shopping-mall memory. 
A. 0% 
B. 100% 
C. 25% 
D. 50% 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(11) Loftus (1993) and Hymann and Pentland (1996) showed what? 
A. Counterfactual thinking leads to very accurate memories 
B. Thinking about an event is not as important as imagining an event 
C. False memories rarely occur 
D. false memories can be created when people think about childhood events in an 
attempt to remember them 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(12) What is the most arguable of the individual differences considered in the false memory 
literature? 
A. Susceptibility to hypnosis 
B. Gender 
C. Age 
D. Susceptibility to suggestion 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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Treiman (2000) 
 
(1) What is the alphabetic principle? 
A. appreciating that many languages, in the written form, use a set of symbols or letters  
 B. appreciating how the letters in printed words 
 C. appreciating that there are some rules in how letters can be combined in the  
spelling of words 
 D. appreciating how the spelling of words can be inconsistent 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
(2) What is the phoneme? 
 A. basic sound unit of a language 
 B. the sound structure of a language 
 C. a syllable 
 D. a cluster of consonants 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(3) A syllable can be subdivided into  
 A. consonant clusters 
 B. vowel clusters 
 C. letter segments 
 D. onset and rime 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(4) Studies have shown that training in _______ can improve reading and spelling ability in 
children. 
 A. the names of letters 
 B. analyzing linguistic structure 
 C. phonological awareness 
 D. how to spell their names 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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(5) What has been the implicit assumption about how children learn letter names and letter 
sounds? 
 A. they learn them via imitating adult speech 
 B. they learn them unconsciously when listening to adults speak 
 C. they learn them via experimentation with different sounds 
 D. they learn them via rote memorization 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
(6) Recent studies by Treiman et al. have found that an important determinant of knowledge of 
letter-sounds is 
 A. whether the letter’s sound occurs in the name of the letter 
 B. whether the letter is voiced or unvoiced 
 C. the place of articulation of the sound 
 D. the spelling of the child’s name 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
7. Young Joe is more likely to now the __________ of the letter ‘j’ than Alice or Tom. 
 A. place of articulation 
 B. phoneme 
 C. name 
 D. sound 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
 
8. There is a widespread view that young children are purely ________ readers, memorizing 
associations between whole printed words and their spoken form.  
 A. logographic 
 B. autonomic 
 D. articulate 
 E. biographic 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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(9) A child who possess phonological awareness knows that “bat” and “got” are alike 
A. they both have a vowel in the middle of the word creating a similar phoneme 
B. the both have 3 letters creating a similar phoneme 
C. because they share the 3rd phoneme 
D. they are both 1 syllable  
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(10) Letter knowledge includes ALL of the following EXCEPT 
A. knowledge of letter names  
B. ability to retrieve this information quickly 
C. knowledge of letter sounds 
D. knowledge of letter stems 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
(11) Recent studies 
A. support the idea that children learn the sounds of letters through rote memorization 
B. show letter knowledge and phoneme awareness are related 
C. found letter-sound knowledge is largely determined by if the sound of the letter is 
in its name 
D. support the idea that poor readers have good letter knowledge but poor phoneme 
awareness 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
  
(12) What does logographic mean? 
A. readers memorize associations between printed words and spoken words in a rote 
fashion 
B. Readers associate sounds with letters 
C. Readers associate letter names with their sounds 
D. Readers memorize the look of the letter 
 
Not at all Sure                Somewhat Sure  Strongly Sure 
                1                      2                        3                     4                     5 
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Material 3.  
Example of Experiment 1 Feedback. 
 
 
Loftus (1993) was the first systematic study to show what?
A. Detailed false memories for a whole event could be implanted.
B. Emotional events tend to be particularly salient and memorable.
C. Counterfactual thoughts can affect people's judgment of 
outcomes.
D. People tend to misremember childhood events.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Your answer was: (D) People tend to misremember childhood 
events
The CORRECT answer was: (A) Detailed false memories for a 
whole event could be implanted. 
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Material 4. 
Example of Experiment 2 Feedback. 
 
 
 
Loftus (1993) was the first systematic study to show what?
A. Detailed false memories for a whole event could be implanted.
B. Emotional events tend to be particularly salient and memorable.
C. Counterfactual thoughts can affect people's judgment of 
outcomes.
D. People tend to misremember childhood events.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Your answer was: (D)
The CORRECT answer was: (A) 
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Material 5. 
Example of Children’s Material Questions Used with Preschool Participants. 
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Material 6. 
Smiley Confidence Materials. 
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Material 7. 
Example of Children’s Material Questions Used with College Participants. 
 
 
What did Minerva's baby sister have for breakfast?
toast
oatmeal
pancakes eggs
 
